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This article examines the trial transcript and judicial opinion in 
the 1924 naturalization trial of Tatos Cartozian, whose naturalization 
was opposed by the United States Department of Labor based on the 
assertion that as an Armenian he was not “white” and was therefore 
racially ineligible for naturalization under a law that limited eligibility 
for naturalization to “white persons” and other racial groups until 
1952. The article situates the case within its legal and historical 
context then examines the arguments advanced by the Armenian 
defense during the trial as reflected in the transcript preserved by the 
National Archives and Records Administration, particularly the 
defense’s portrayal of Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims as historical 
persecutors of Armenians in Asia Minor. The article argues that the 
persecutory agency in the defense’s trial narrative created a powerful 
sense of social solidarity with Americans by portraying Turkey as a 
common enemy of Americans and Armenians during the post-World 
War I era and examines the consequences of this rhetorical strategy. 
After examining the transcript, the article then examines how the 
judicial opinion responds to the defense’s rhetorical strategy and 
argues that although the opinion adopts the defense’s narrative, the 
opinion reflects an inability or refusal to clearly delineate the agency 
in the narrative, is marked by a style that suggests a broader resistance 
to narrativity, and remains silent on the Armenian genocide and 
diaspora at the center of the case, all of which suggest an 
uncomfortable relationship to the “historical interpretation” of race 
that had recently emerged as an interpretive strategy in the case law 
surrounding the Naturalization Act. The article concludes by reflecting 
on the rhetorical strategy of unification against a common enemy 
found in Cartozian and elsewhere in the discourse regarding the racial 
prerequisite in the early Naturalization Act, what the strategy suggests 
about the function of narrative in naturalization discourse, and how 
the strategy helped to define American identity amid growing tensions 
between race, nationality, and religion in the early twentieth century. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Q. Are there not also Armenians who are Mohammedans? 
A. Not one, only if they have become Mohammedan by force, by 
persecution . . . . 
Q. But people of Armenian origin and race and blood do belong 
to the Mohammedan faith; have joined that faith? Is that not true? 
A. By force, perhaps, they have been made, during the massacres, 
to save their lives. 
Cross-examination of M.B. Parounagian during the 1924 
naturalization trial of Tatos Cartozian1 
I found that Armenians assimilate with American life more 
readily than any other race from Southeastern Europe or Asia Minor, 
for two reasons. One is that the American missionaries who have been 
working in Armenia and among the Armenians for one hundred years 
have acquainted the American public about the Armenians. . . . The 
other reason is that Armenians have been known among the Christian 
people of Europe and America as the great defenders of the Christian 
religion, and I believe there is an admiration for the Armenians for the 
way they have withstood the onslaught of Mohammedanism. 
Direct examination of M. Vartan Malcolm, author of The 
Armenians in America, during the 1924 naturalization trial of Tatos 
Cartozian2 
Q. What was the attitude of the Armenian race in so far as you 
came in contact with them during the World War? 
A. It was one of the most inspiring experiences in my life. They 
were willing to serve, not only as enemies of Turkey, not only to defend 
their own native country, but they felt a deep loyalty to this country. All 
of them were willing to enter the army; and I know a great many cases 
of Armenians who came a great distance, paid their own expenses and 
entered the United States army and never were sent across to fight the 
Turks. 
Direct examination of Mrs. Otis Floyd Lamson during the 1924 
                                                                                                       
 1. Transcript of Evidence, United States v. Cartozian, No. E-8668 (D. Or. May 8-
9, 1924), at 17-18, in Civil and Criminal Case Files, District of Oregon (Portland), 
Records of the District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21, National 
Archives and Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, Wash. 
[hereinafter Cartozian Trial Transcript]. 
 2. Id. at 126-27. 
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naturalization trial of Tatos Cartozian3 
The epigraphs above appear in the transcript of a trial that was 
held in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon on 
May 8-9, 1924 to determine whether Armenian immigrant Tatos 
Cartozian was eligible to become an American citizen by 
naturalization. The United States Bureau of Naturalization, then under 
the direction of the Department of Labor and represented by attorneys 
from the Department of Justice, opposed Cartozian’s naturalization 
based on the assertion that as an Armenian he was not “white” and was 
therefore racially ineligible for naturalization. The Naturalization Act 
of 1790 limited eligibility for naturalization to “free white persons,” 
and in 1870, after Pacific Coast senators who sought to prevent the 
naturalization of Chinese immigrants defeated a Civil War 
Reconstruction amendment that sought to remove the racial 
requirement from the Act, a compromise amendment was passed 
extending racial eligibility for naturalization to both “free white 
persons” and “aliens of African nativity and persons of African 
descent.” Consequently, from 1870 to 1940, to be eligible for 
naturalization a person had to be either “white” or “African,” but the 
racial eligibility of Asian petitioners remained disputed because some 
claimed that they fit neither of the racial categories recognized by the 
Act.4 Although after 1940 eligibility for naturalization was also 
extended to “descendants of races indigenous to the Western 
Hemisphere,” “Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent,” 
“Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent,” and “persons of 
races indigenous to India,” the Act continued to limit eligibility by race 
until the racial prerequisites were finally removed in 1952.5 
During this period any court of general jurisdiction could grant a 
naturalization certificate, and until the late nineteenth century no 
                                                                                                       
 3. Id. at 60-61. 
 4. See Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (1790); Naturalization Act 
of Jan. 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414 (1795); Naturalization Act of Apr. 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 153 
(1802); Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1802, 2 Stat. 292 (1804); Naturalization Act of 
May 26, 1824, 4 Stat. 69 (1824); Naturalization Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 254 
(1870); Revised Statutes §§ 2165-74 (1875);.Act of Feb. 18, 1875, 18 Stat. 316 (1875); 
Revised Statutes §§ 2165-74 (2d ed. 1878); DARRELL HEVENOR SMITH, THE BUREAU OF 
NATURALIZATION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION (1926). 
 5. See Naturalization Act of Oct. 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940); Naturalization 
Act of Dec. 17, 1943, 57 Stat. 600 (1943); Naturalization Act of July 2, 1946, 60 Stat. 
416 (1946). 
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published judicial opinions were issued regarding the racial 
prerequisite in the Act.6 Between 1878 and 1954, however, numerous 
federal and state courts, and ultimately the United States Board of 
Immigration Appeals, issued written opinions offering interpretations 
of the phrase “white person” in response to the naturalization petitions 
of numerous immigrants from Asia and the Pacific Rim.7 These cases, 
which have come to be known as the “racial prerequisite cases,” offer 
conflicting opinions about the meaning of race in cases involving 
Chinese, American Indian, Hawaiian, Burmese, Japanese, Asian 
Indian, Mexican, Parsi, Filipino, Syrian, Korean, Afghan, Iraqi, 
Armenian, Turkish, Arabian, Tatar, and Kalmyk petitioners.8 The 
courts in these cases frequently noted the difficulty of determining the 
racial classification of individual petitioners and appealed to Congress 
                                                                                                       
 6. See SMITH, supra note 4. 
 7. Only two of the cases addressed the subsequent extension of the act to non-
“white” racial classifications. One case addressed the meaning of the phrase “aliens of 
African nativity and persons of African descent,” see In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774 
(E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that a petitioner who was three-quarters Native American 
and one-quarter African was not of sufficient “African descent” to be eligible under the 
Act), and another case addressed the meaning of the phrase “persons of Chinese 
descent,” see In re B–-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 304 (B.I.A. 1948) (holding that a person born in 
Germany of a German mother, but of a father who was Siamese but “predominantly 
Chinese in blood,” was neither a “white person” nor a “person of Chinese descent”). 
 8. For a comprehensive list of published judicial opinions addressing the racial 
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, see IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1st ed. 1996). In addition to the cases identified by 
López, the United States Board of Immigration Appeals issued a series of racial 
prerequisite cases under § 13(c) of the Immigration Act of 1924, which prohibited the 
admission to the United States of any alien “ineligible to citizenship” as defined in part 
by the racial eligibility provisions of the Naturalization Act. See Immigration Act of 
1924, §§ 13(c), 28(c), 43 Stat. 153 (1924). See also In re S–-, 1 I & N Dec. 174 (B.I.A. 
1941) (holding that a native and citizen of Iraq, whose parents were “full-blooded 
Arabians” and whose ancestors “came from Turkish stock,” was a “white person”); In 
re K–-, 2 I & N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 1945) (holding that a native and citizen of 
Afghanistan, “of the Afghan race,” was a “white person”); In re B–-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 
304 (B.I.A 1948) (holding that a person born in Germany of a German mother, but of a 
father who was Siamese but “predominantly Chinese in blood,” was neither a “white 
person” nor a “person of Chinese descent”); In re S–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 104 (B.I.A. 1950) 
(holding that a native and citizen of Russia “of the Tartar race, born in Ufa, Russia,” 
was a “white person”); In re R–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 1951) (holding that natives 
of Russia “whose blood was found to be predominantly that of the Kalmuk race” were 
“white persons”); In re J–- W–- F–-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 200 (B.I.A. 1954) (holding that a 
native of the Philippines, but “racially Chinese (full blood)” was not a “white person”). 
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to clarify the meaning of the Act, and the opinions conflicted so widely 
that one court labeled the racial classification issue a “Serbonian bog.”9 
Because the racial prerequisite cases required litigants, lawyers, 
and judges to advance arguments and evidence in support of particular 
racial classifications in the procedurally structured setting of a judicial 
proceeding with formal provisions for discovery, the subpoena of 
witnesses and other evidence, and opportunities for both sides to be 
heard, the cases offer a unique opportunity to study the rhetorical 
dimensions of racial discourse and the role of law in constructing racial 
identities. As Ian Haney López writes in White by Law: The Legal 
Construction of Race, the racial prerequisite cases litigated whether, 
for example, “a petitioner’s race was to be measured by skin color, 
facial features, national origin, language, culture, ancestry, the 
speculations of scientists, popular opinion, or some combination of 
these factors,”10 and the rhetorical strategies employed in advancing 
one or more of these factors in particular cases provide a rich source 
for studying the discourse of race and law. The racial prerequisite cases 
are also unique because they forced participants to contrast “white” not 
with the racial category of “black” or “African” but with “Asian,” as 
numerous immigrants from Asia and the Pacific Rim, including many 
from western Asia and the Middle East, petitioned for naturalization. 
Although Europeans often described Chinese and Japanese people as 
“white” in their first encounters with them11 and early courts granted 
Chinese immigrants naturalization certificates without apparently 
                                                                                                       
 9. See In re Dow, 213 F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915). 
The figure of a Serbonian bog derives from Lake Sardonis, said to have been between 
Egypt and Palestine, which had the deceptive appearance of solid ground because of 
the sand that blew into it. The phrase figuratively refers to any situation from which it 
is difficult to extricate oneself. Cf. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 592-94 (David Scott 
Kastan, ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2005) (“A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog / . . . 
Where armies whole have sunk . . . .”). 
 10. LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 2. 
 11. See MICHAEL KEEVAK, BECOMING YELLOW: A SHORT HISTORY OF RACIAL 
THINKING 4, 27, 37, 41-42 (2011). Early classifications of Chinese and Japanese people 
as “white” even used particularly unequivocal descriptions such as “rather white” 
(zimblich weiß), “truly white” (véritablement blanc), “completely white” (fulkomligen 
hvita), “white like us” (bianchi, si come siamo noi), and “as white as we are” (aussi 
blancs que nous). Id. In one particularly noteworthy example, George Washington 
wrote in 1785 correspondence to his former aid-de-camp, Tinch Tilghman, that he was 
surprised to receive a report that Chinese sailors resembled American Indians because 
he “had conceived an idea that the Chinese, tho’ droll in shape and appearance, were 
yet white.” Id. at 36. 
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questioning their racial eligibility for naturalization,12 by the mid-
nineteenth century racialist science had begun to advance the theory 
that Asians belonged to a “yellow” race that occupied a suspect 
“middle” position between the “white” and “black” races.13 The racial 
prerequisite cases challenged this newly emerging distinction between 
“white” and “yellow” races as petitioners from all corners of Asia 
claimed to be “white.” 
Although few records of the proceedings in the racial prerequisite 
cases exist, Cartozian is a remarkable exception because the National 
Archives and Records Administration has preserved a nearly complete 
record of the proceedings in the case, including a 167-page transcript 
of a two-day trial, a 97-page transcript of four expert depositions, a 30-
page defense brief, trial exhibits, and other documents, and because the 
Armenian lobby mounted an unparalleled defense in the case. 
According to one source, the Armenian community raised 
approximately $50,000 in donations to defend the case (equivalent to 
over $500,000 today), and shortly after the case was filed the lead 
attorney for the Armenian defense informed the Government’s attorney 
in the case that the Armenians would spare no expense to defend the 
case.14 The defense hired the prestigious Portland law firm McCamant 
and Thompson to represent Cartozian and offered the testimony of 
twenty-three witnesses at trial, including renowned Columbia 
University anthropologist Franz Boas, Harvard ethnologist Roland 
                                                                                                       
 12. Until the Chinese Exclusion Act expressly prohibited Chinese naturalizations in 
1882, courts frequently granted Chinese immigrants naturalization certificates as 
reflected, for example, in accounts of Chinese naturalizations in New York and North 
Carolina as early as the 1830s. See, e.g., JOHN KUO WEI TCHEN, NEW YORK BEFORE 
CHINATOWN: ORIENTALISM AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1776-1882, at 76, 
136, 231-32 (1999). Furthermore, a July 22, 1870 newspaper article recounts 
Massachusetts’ longstanding practice of naturalizing “Chinese as well as other 
Asiatics” since at least 1843, along with “natives of the Sandwich Islands” and 
“persons of African descent, who are not darker than ordinary white persons.” See 
BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, July 22, 1870, at column A. As late as the turn of the 
twentieth century, the United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts also 
found that it had long been its practice to admit Asians to citizenship. See In re 
Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 843-44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). 
 13. See KEEVAK, supra note 11, at 19, 49, 60, 74-75. 
 14. See Earlene Craver, On the Boundary of White: The Cartozian Naturalization 
Case and the Armenians, 1923-1925, 28 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 30 (2009); Phillip 
Lothyan, A Questions of Citizenship, 3 PROLOGUE 21, 267, at 272 (Fall 1989). 
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Dixon, German geographer and political economist Paul Rohrbach, and 
James Barton, foreign secretary of the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions who headed the relief expedition 
in Turkey after World War I. The defense also offered twenty-two 
exhibits into evidence, including a comparative list of English and 
Armenian words and a tabulation of 339 answers to a questionnaire 
sent to Armenian men in the United States regarding their residence, 
citizenship, occupation, and membership in Christian churches and 
professional, civic, and fraternal organizations.15 The record of these 
proceedings offers the most detailed record available of the arguments 
and evidence advanced to determine whether an individual petitioner 
was “white” within the meaning of the racial prerequisite in the 
Naturalization Act. 
Despite this substantial record, prior scholars have largely treated 
Cartozian as a footnote to the earlier case of In re Halladjian, in which 
a federal district court in Massachusetts held that four Armenians were 
“white” and therefore racially eligible for naturalization,16 a case that 
had served as precedent on the question of Armenian eligibility for 
naturalization before Cartozian. Furthermore, those scholars who have 
discussed Cartozian have mostly limited their remarks to the 
arguments and evidence presented by the defense regarding Armenian 
assimilability with “white” Europeans and Americans, including 
ethnographic and statistical evidence of prior Armenian naturalizations 
in the United States and Armenian marriages to contemporary 
Europeans and Americans. In Whitewashed: America’s Invisible 
Middle Eastern Minority, for example, John Tehranian argues that 
Cartozian epitomizes performative aspects of whiteness reflected in the 
racial prerequisite cases and concludes that “performance of whiteness 
and perceived assimilatory capacity played a critical role in the court’s 
decision” in the case.17 Similarly, in an article in the National Archives 
publication Prologue, Phillip Lothyan focuses exclusively on evidence 
of census figures regarding the number of Armenian naturalizations in 
the United States, evidence of affinities between European and 
Armenian languages, and evidence that Armenians intermarried and 
                                                                                                       
 15. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at a-d, 104; United States v. 
Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D. Or. 1925). See also Craver, supra note 14, at 44-51. 
 16. See In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). 
 17. JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN 
MINORITY 51-54 (2009). 
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assimilated quickly with Europeans and Americans.18 In Ian Haney 
López’s White by Law, the only book-length study of the racial 
prerequisite cases, López only mentions Cartozian in passing to note 
that Columbia University anthropologist Franz Boas provided expert 
testimony in the case,19 and Matthew Frye Jacobson gives the case a 
similar treatment in Whiteness of a Different Color: European 
Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race,”20 as does Ariela Gross in What 
Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America.21 
The epigraphs above reveal another rhetorical strategy that played 
a dominant role in the trial and judicial opinion in Cartozian, however, 
a strategy that is the inverse of Armenian assimilability with “white” 
Europeans and Americans. According to the Armenian defense, it was 
significant not only that the Armenians readily assimilated with 
Europeans and Americans but that Armenians were entirely 
inassimilable with their Islamic neighbors in Asia Minor. According to 
the defense, this inassimilability was evidenced by Armenian support 
of Europeans during the Crusades and by Muslim persecution of the 
                                                                                                       
 18. See Lothyan, supra note 14. Likewise, in a recent article discussing the archival 
records in the case, Earlene Craver focuses primarily on the direct evidence of 
assimilability in the case. See Craver, supra note 14, at 56. 
 19. LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
 20. See MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 240 (1998). 
 21. See ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL 
IN AMERICA 235 (2008); see also Janice Okoomian, Becoming White: Contested 
History, Armenian American Women, and Racialized Bodies, 27 MELUS 213, no. 1, 
Spring 2002 (emphasizing direct evidence of assimilability in the case). At least one 
later court also emphasizes the direct evidence of assimilability in Cartozian. In In re 
Hassan, Judge Arthur Tuttle cites Cartozian in support of his holding that an “Arab, 
being a native of Yemen,” was not a “white person” and was therefore racially 
ineligible for naturalization. See In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1942). 
Judge Tuttle states: 
It is recognized that in United States v. Cartozian . . . , the District 
Court held an Armenian from Asia Minor eligible to citizenship as a 
white person. The court there found, however, that the Armenians are 
a Christian people living in an area close to the European border, who 
have intermingled and intermarried with Europeans over a period of 
centuries. Evidence was also presented in that case of a considerable 
amount of intermarriage of Armenian immigrants to the United States 
with other racial strains in our population. These facts serve to 
distinguish the case of the Armenians from that of the Arabians. 
Id. at 846. 
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Armenians since the rise of the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the 
Armenian genocide of World War I. This rhetorical strategy operated 
on many levels, but it particularly appealed to the process of 
transcending social division by adopting a perspective of unity in 
relation to shared fear of an outgroup threat, a process Kenneth Burke 
describes as “identification by antithesis,” in which “allies who would 
otherwise dispute among themselves join forces against a common 
enemy.”22 In the epigraphs above, M.B. Parounagian testifies that the 
Armenians were persecuted by Ottoman Turks who forced Armenians 
to convert to Islam “during the massacres, to save their lives,” a 
reference to the Turkish massacres of Armenians that escalated during 
the 1890s through the Armenian genocide of World War I and resulted 
in many Armenian refugees fleeing to the United States.23 Similarly, 
M. Vartan Malcolm testifies that Europeans and Americans admired 
Armenians as “the great defenders of the Christian religion” who 
withstood “the onslaught of Mohammedanism” at the hands of the 
Turks, and Mrs. Otis Floyd Lamson testifies of how Armenians fought 
with American troops against a common enemy during World War I. 
Similar references to the Crusades, the Hamidian massacres of 
Armenians during the 1890s, and the Armenian genocide of World 
War I are found throughout the trial transcript. 
Many scholars have studied the tendency to unify against a 
common enemy in the context of intergroup conflict and war. Social 
scientists, for example, have studied the relationship between outgroup 
                                                                                                       
 22. See KENNETH BURKE, DRAMATISM AND DEVELOPMENT 28 (1972) [hereinafter 
DRAMATISM]; see also KENNETH BURKE, The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM: STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC ACTION (3d ed. 1973). Burke 
also notes that this antithetical form of identification can serve to deflect criticism, 
because “a politician can call any criticism of his policies ‘unpatriotic,’ on the grounds 
that it reinforces the claims of the nation’s enemies.” See DRAMATISM, supra, at 28. 
Burke introduced “identification” as the central concept of the rhetoric of symbolic 
action to replace the more instrumental and propositional rhetorics of earlier theorists. 
In contrast to such earlier rhetorics, Burke proposed that persuasion operates by the 
process of merger and division by which people form collective identities, or by the 
perennial struggle between “us” and “them.” See Identification, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
RHETORIC 375, 375 (Thomas O. Sloane ed., 2001). 
 23. Indeed, most Armenian immigrants who came to the United States during the 
early twentieth century came as refugees. See LESLIE A. DAVIS, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE 
PROVINCE: AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT’S REPORT ON THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE, 1915-
1917 (Susan K. Blair ed., 1989). 
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threats and ingroup cooperation,24 and scholars in rhetorical and 
literary studies, political science, and history have all studied the use of 
shared enmities to construct group identities in the writing of history, 
literature, and war propaganda.25 Similarly, veteran war correspondents 
have written extensively about the powerful solidarity formed among 
those engaged in war.26 Such studies frequently note the deep 
emotional attachment that results from fear of a common enemy and 
the costly sacrifices individuals experiencing this attachment make to 
defend the group. As Chris Hedges writes, “the communal march 
against an enemy generates a warm, unfamiliar bond with our 
neighbors, our community, our nation, wiping out unsettling 
                                                                                                       
 24. See, e.g., Masaki Yuki and Kunihiro Yokota, The Primal Warrior: Outgroup 
Threat Priming Enhances Intergroup Discrimination in Men But Not Women, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 271 (Jan. 2009); see also, e.g., LAWRENCE LESHAN, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR: COMPREHENDING ITS MYSTIQUE AND ITS MADNESS (1992); Mark 
Van Vugt, David De Cremer, and Dirk P. Janssen, Gender Differences in Cooperation 
and Competition: The Male Warrior Hypothesis, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 19 (Jan. 2007). In a 
classic investigation of intergroup conflict known as the Robbers Cave experiment, 
researchers studied the effectiveness of measures to reduce intergroup conflict among 
youth groups at a summer camp and concluded that the most effective method for 
reducing the conflict was the introduction of a series of superordinate goals requiring 
intergroup cooperation. See MUZAHER SHERIF, O.J. HARVEY, B. JACK WHITE, WILLIAM 
R. HOOD, AND CAROLYN W. SHERIF, THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP 
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1961). Although the Robbers Cave researchers claim to 
have rejected the introduction of a “common enemy” as a means of reducing the 
conflict in their experiment because it implied intergroup conflict on a larger scale, in 
at least one of the experiments they suggested to their subjects that “vandals” may have 
been responsible for an interruption of water supply that intergroup cooperation was 
required to restore. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., SUSAN A. BREWER, WHY AMERICA FIGHTS: PATRIOTISM AND WAR 
PROPAGANDA FROM THE PHILIPPINES TO IRAQ 46-86 (2009); JEFFREY JEROME COHEN, 
HYBRIDITY, IDENTITY AND MONSTROSITY IN MEDIEVAL BRITAIN: ON DIFFICULT 
MIDDLES (2006); MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE 66-89 
(1988); JEREMY ENGELS, ENEMYSHIP: DEMOCRACY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN THE 
EARLY REPUBLIC (2010); IGAL HALFIN, INTIMATE ENEMIES: DEMONIZING THE 
BOLSHEVIK OPPOSITION, 1918-1928 (2007); DOUGLAS WALTON, APPEAL TO PITY: 
ARGUMENTUM AD MISERICORDIAM (1997); Robert L. Ivie, Images of Savagery in 
American Justifications for War, 47 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS 279 (1980); Eve 
Kornfeld, Encountering “the Other”: American Intellectuals and Indians in the 1790s, 
52 WM. & MARY Q. 287 (1995); Vladimir Zorić, The Furies of Orestes: Constructing 
Persecutory Agency in Narratives of Exile, 5 COMP. CRITICAL STUD. 179 (2008). 
 26. See, e.g., CHRIS HEDGES, WAR IS A FORCE THAT GIVES US MEANING (2002); 
ANTHONY LLOYD, MY WAR GONE BY, I MISS IT SO (1999). 
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undercurrents of alienation and dislocation,”27 and Sam Keen notes in 
his study of political propaganda that “the majority of tribes and 
nations create a sense of social solidarity and membership in part by 
systematically creating enemies.”28 In Cartozian, the defense sought to 
defend Armenians’ racial identity with “white” America by not only 
offering direct evidence of their assimilability with Europeans and 
Americans, but through what Murray Edelman calls a “dramaturgy of 
enmity”29 that invoked anti-Islamic prejudice encoded in centuries of 
cultural memories of the Crusades, a narrative that represented 
Armenians as Christian martyrs at the hands of “black pagans, Turks, 
and Saracens.”30 This narrative also echoed American war propaganda 
during World War I that had thematically invoked the imagery of the 
Crusades in portrayals of the war as a war between “white” Christians 
and dark barbarian “Huns,” and appealed to significant tensions that 
lingered between the United States and Turkey during the postwar 
period as a result of Turkey’s opposition to the establishment of an 
independent republic of Armenia and its continued massacres of 
Armenians and American missionaries. Accordingly, the defense’s 
narrative of persecution by the Ottoman Turks in Cartozian appealed 
both to historical fears of barbarian invaders in medieval Europe 
recently called to mind by American war propaganda and to 
contemporary fears of Turkish aggression.31 
                                                                                                       
 27. HEDGES, supra note 26, at 9, 45, 74. 
 28. SAM KEEN, FACES OF THE ENEMY: REFLECTIONS OF THE HOSTILE IMAGINATION 
17 (1986). Keen argues that “we scapegoat and create absolute enemies, not because 
we are intrinsically cruel, but because focusing our anger on an outside target, striking 
at strangers, brings our tribe or nation together allows us to be part of a close and 
loving in-group.” Id. at 27. Thus, according to Keen “we create surplus evil because 
we need to belong.” Id. 
 29. See EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 78, 83. In his discussion of the rhetorical 
construction of political enemies, Edelman writes that “the highlighting of foreign 
enemies to weaken domestic dissent or divert attention from domestic problems is a 
classic political gambit because it is so often an effective one.” Id. 
 30. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Richard II, in THE OXFORD SHAKESPEARE THE 
COMPLETE WORKS 339, 359 (John Jowett et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Richard 
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Saracens”). This passage of Richard II is quoted in Judge Lowell’s opinion in In re 
Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). 
 31. See, e.g., BREWER, supra note 25, at 46-86. The postwar tension between the 
United States and Turkey related in large part to the status of Armenian refugees 
created by the Armenian genocide of World War I and efforts to establish an 
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Significantly, although prior critics have argued that direct 
evidence of assimilability played a pivotal role in the racial prerequisite 
cases and Cartozian in particular, this emphasis on direct evidence of 
assimilability fails to account, on the one hand, for cases in which 
petitioners were held to be racially ineligible for naturalization despite 
having offered powerful assimilability evidence, and on the other hand 
for cases in which petitioners were held racially eligible for 
naturalization despite having offered relatively little assimilability 
evidence. In a case decided only two years before Cartozian, for 
example, the United States Supreme Court noted that although 
Japanese petitioner Takao Ozawa had attended American schools and 
churches with his family and maintained the use of English in his 
home, because he belonged to the “Japanese race” he was not “white” 
and was therefore racially ineligible for naturalization.32 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                       
independent republic of Armenia. Although President Wilson initially awarded 
territory to establish an independent republic of Armenia in the Treaty of Sèvres, after 
Turkish nationalists gained independence for Turkey they renegotiated the terms of 
postwar peace in the Treaty of Lausanne which established the current borders of 
Turkey and awarded no territory to Armenia. The United States Senate refused to ratify 
the Treaty of Lausanne, but it nonetheless prevailed as the final negotiation of 
Turkey’s postwar borders after the other major powers ratified it. See generally 
STANFORD J. SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY (1976). 
Even before World War I, conflict between the United States and the Ottoman Empire 
had emerged over the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act. On November 1, 
1909, shortly after the Chief of the Naturalization Division of the Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization issued a restrictive interpretation of the racial 
prerequisite that concluded Turks, Syrians, and other “Asiatics” were non-“white” and 
therefore ineligible for naturalization, the Turkish embassy vigorously protested the 
Bureau’s position. See generally Turkey Will Protest, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1909; 
Conflicting Views Taken of Asiatic Exclusion, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1909; 
Aliens Refused Naturalization, DULUTH (MINN.) NEWS TRIBUNE, Sept. 29, 1909; Race 
Row Up To Courts, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1909. This protest included an open letter 
from the Ottoman Charge d’Affairs denouncing the Bureau’s position in the 
Washington Post, calling the Bureau’s interpretation of the act as “pernicious as it is 
artificial, since it is calculated to hinder the cause of peace, amity, and brotherhood 
among the natives, that cause so eloquently preached from the American pulpit and 
tribune.” A. Rustem Bey, Thinks Law Unfair, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1909. 
 32. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 189-190 (1922). Ozawa argued that 
the Japanese were assimilable with life in the United States in part by noting that “in 
art and literature, the criticism of the Japanese today is of the abandonment of their 
ideas, and too easy adaptation to western methods.” Like the defense in Cartozian, 
Ozawa also cited Japanese marriages to Europeans and Americans. Brief for Petitioner 
at 78, Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1918) (No. 222). In addition, Ozawa 
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina 
repeatedly held that Syrian petitioners were not “white” and were 
therefore racially ineligible for naturalization despite ample evidence 
that they belonged to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition by both 
faith and geography and in the face of the assertion that any 
interpretation of the Naturalization Act that excluded them would also 
exclude those with similar origins, including, hypothetically, Jesus of 
Nazareth.33 On the other hand, various Turkish, Arab, Parsi, Asian 
Indian, and Kalmyk petitioners were held to be “white” and therefore 
racially eligible for naturalization despite their geographical origins in 
Asia and their Islamic, Zoroastrian, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist 
religious backgrounds.34 These and other racial prerequisite cases 
cannot be understood solely by reference to direct evidence of 
assimilability or the “performance of whiteness and perceived 
assimilatory capacity.”35 
To explore these issues, this article will examine the rhetorical 
strategies reflected in Cartozian. The article will begin by situating the 
case within its historical context during a time of crisis for Armenian 
refugees as postwar negotiations for an independent Armenia grew 
increasingly doubtful and within the legal context of case law 
                                                                                                       
quoted an American educator who had written that “those Japanese born and nurtured 
in Hawaii are as much American as the children of the descendants of the Pilgrim 
Fathers that came to this country to Christianize the Hawaiians.” Id. at 83. 
 33. See Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 816 (E.D.S.C. 1913); see also In re Dow, 213 
F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914). The decisions in these cases were later reversed by Dow v. 
United States, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915). See generally Sarah Gualtieri, Becoming 
“White”: Race, Religion and the Foundations of Syrian/Lebanese Ethnicity in the 
United States, 20 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 29, 41-42 (2001). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1910); In re 
Mozumdar, 207 F. 115, 117 (E.D. Wash. 1913); In re Singh, 257 F. 209, 212 (S.D. 
Cal. 1919); In re Sallak, No. 14876 (N.D. Ill., East. Div., June 27, 1924), in Significant 
Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925, District of Oregon (Portland), Records of 
U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group 118, National Archives and Records 
Administration Pacific Alaska Region (holding that a petitioner “born in Palestine” 
was a “white person”); In re S–-, 1 I & N Dec. 174 (B.I.A. 1941); Ex parte Mohriez, 
54 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944); In re Shaikhaly, Nat. Case No. 119332 (S.D. 
Cal. Dec. 20, 1944), in Folder 119332, Contested Naturalizations, Southern District of 
California, Central Division (Los Angeles), National Archives and Records 
Administration Pacific Region (holding that “a native and citizen of Palestine . . . of 
the Arabian race,” was a “white person”); In re K–-, 2 I & N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 1945); 
In re R–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 1951). 
 35. TEHRANIAN, supra note 17, at 51-54. 
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interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, 
particularly the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Ozawa v. 
United States (1922) and United States v. Thind (1923). The article will 
then examine the rhetorical strategy of the Armenian defense reflected 
in the trial transcript, particularly the portrayal of Turks, Kurds, and 
Syrian Muslims as historical persecutors of Armenians. The article 
argues that by portraying Turkey as a common enemy during the 
postwar period the defense’s narrative created a powerful sense of 
social solidarity with Americans, but that the trial transcript also 
reflects a tension between this strategy and Armenians’ protonationalist 
aspirations for an independent nation and was premised on a negation 
of Armenian national agency that metaphorically echoed the genocide 
the Armenians suffered in World War I, highlighting difficult identity 
issues in the case that the judicial opinion does not reflect. The article 
then examines Judge Charles Wolverton’s judicial opinion in 
Cartozian in light of the arguments advanced during the trial and 
argues that although Judge Wolverton adopts the defense’s narrative of 
Armenian inassimilability with the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims 
of Asia Minor as a central justification for his conclusion that 
Armenians are “white,” his opinion leaves the agency in the historical 
narrative on which he relies ambiguous and reflects a broader refusal 
of narrativity that suggests an uncomfortable relationship with the 
“historical interpretation” of race that had recently emerged in case law 
interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act. The article 
concludes by reflecting more generally on the rhetorical strategy of 
unifying against a common enemy as a strategy evident throughout the 
long of discourse surrounding the racial prerequisites to naturalization 
and how this strategy helped to define American identity amid growing 
tensions between race, nationality, and religion in the early twentieth 
century. 
 
THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CARTOZIAN 
On April 24, 2010, President Barack Obama marked the ninety-
fifth anniversary of the Armenian genocide by remarking that “on this 
solemn day of remembrance, we pause to recall that 95 years ago one 
of the worst atrocities of the 20th century began,” for “in that dark 
moment of history, 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched 
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to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.”36 Between 
1894 and 1896, Turkish attacks on the Armenian minority in the 
Ottoman Empire resulted in the deaths of approximately 100,000-
250,000 Armenians in what were referred to as the Hamidian 
massacres, named after Sultan Abdul Hamid II, also known as the 
“Red Sultan” or the “Bloody Sultan” for his Armenian massacres. 
Following the rise of the Young Turks, another 15,000-25,000 
Armenians were massacred in the region of Adana, Turkey in the 
spring of 1909, and experts estimate that between one to one and a half 
million Armenians were killed in the Ottoman Empire during World 
War I in what is widely referred to as the Armenian genocide. As 
Vahakn Dadrian remarks, although the number of Armenians who died 
during World War I gives that period a particular gravity, the 
Armenian genocide was “punctuated by a history of accumulative 
tensions, animosities, and attendant sanguinary persecutions, . . . 
anchored on a constantly evolving and critically escalating perpetrator-
victim conflict” extending deep into the history of Anatolia.37 This 
perpetrator-victim conflict is crucial to understanding the arguments 
advanced in support of Armenian racial eligibility for naturalization in 
Cartozian. 
Many critics have argued that the treatment of the Armenian 
Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire was an incident of the rising 
nationalisms of the early twentieth century and the volatile nature of 
state boundaries in the Balkans, Anatolia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, 
which had a profound impact on previously tolerated subjects like the 
Armenians. According to Cathie Carmichael, for example, many of 
these people, including the Armenians, never made the transition from 
subject to citizen. As a result, the practice of population elimination in 
Europe and western Asia from the nineteenth through the mid-
twentieth century occurred because certain groups never received full 
citizenship rights.38 Tragically, the idea that conflicts of nationality and 
citizenship could be resolved by violent population elimination 
inspired a generation of such “eliminationists,” as reflected in the 
question Adolf Hitler is reported to have put to German troops before 
                                                                                                       
 36. Peter Baker, Obama Marks Genocide Without Saying the Word, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2010, at A10. 
 37. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation, in AMERICA 
AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE OF 1915, at 52 (Jay Winter ed., 2003). 
 38. See CATHIE CARMICHAEL, GENOCIDE BEFORE THE HOLOCAUST 3 (2009). 
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the invasion of Poland after instructing them to kill all Polish men, 
women, and children they found: “Who, after all, speaks today about 
the annihilation of the Armenians?”39 As this statement suggests, such 
eliminationist campaigns have often sought to eliminate not only the 
physical presence of the populations they targeted but their historical 
presence as well.40 Although the international movement for 
recognition of the Armenian genocide has recently established it as one 
of the three canonical genocides alongside the Holocaust and Rwanda, 
for decades it was so immersed in silence that it was often referred to 
as the “forgotten genocide,” the “unremembered genocide,” the 
“hidden holocaust,” or the “secret genocide,”41 and it has remained the 
object of genocide denial by Turkey from the immediate postwar 
period to the present.42 
The phrase “crimes against humanity” was originally coined to 
refer to the Armenian genocide and the first war crimes tribunals in 
Turkish history were convened to prosecute Ottoman officials for their 
treatment of Armenians during the war,43 but under the pressure of 
                                                                                                       
 39. See id. at 3, 10; see also ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE 
INTRODUCTION 149 (2d ed., 2011). 
 40. As Lawrence Douglas notes of Israeli Attorney General Gideon Hausner’s 
approach to the subsequent trial of Adolph Eichmann, Hausner treated the Nazis’ crime 
“as both the act of physical annihilation and the more profound attempt to erase 
memory itself—both of the cultural life of a people and of the crimes of the final 
solution.” LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND 
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 41. See PETER BALAKIAN, THE BURNING TIGRIS: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND 
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MÜGE GÖÇEK, The Armenian Genocide, in THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE 360 
(Dan Stone ed., 2008); ROBERT KOOLAKIAN, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A STORY OF THE 
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Armenian genocide, see, e.g., David Rennie, France to Jail Deniers of Armenian 
Genocide, THE DAILY TEL. (London), Oct. 13, 2006, at 21; Sebnem Arsu, Turks Angry 
Over House Armenian Genocide Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007. 
 43. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 331-47; JONES, supra note 39. Significantly, 
these proceedings resulted in a number of guilty verdicts and executions before they 
were abandoned. See, e.g., Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Naim-Andonian Documents on the 
World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide, 18 INT’L 
J. MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 311-60 (1986): 311-60; Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Turkish 
Military Tribunal’s Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major 
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Turkish nationalism the war crimes tribunals were soon abandoned and 
the major powers stopped publicly confronting Turkey about the 
issue.44 For many in America the Armenian genocide had been the 
greatest crime of the war, and the division of the Ottoman Empire to 
create an independent republic of Armenia was considered necessary to 
protect Armenians from further violence in the future. Accordingly, 
President Wilson awarded the Armenians territory in Anatolia for an 
independent republic of Armenia in the Treaty of Sèvres, but after 
Turkey gained independence the Treaty of Sèvres was annulled by the 
Treaty of Lausanne which awarded no territory to Armenians and 
effectively eliminated the possibility of an independent Armenia. The 
United States Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Lausanne over the 
Armenian question, but after the other major powers ratified it the 
treaty ultimately prevailed as the final statement on Turkey’s postwar 
borders.45 Because the Treaty of Lausanne was signed while the 
Cartozian case was pending and it was ratified by the other major 
powers shortly after the trial but before Judge Wolverton issued his 
opinion in the case, the negotiations for an independent Armenia 
during the postwar period and their apparent failure at the time of the 
trial provide a critical context for understanding the stakes of the 
Cartozian case for the many Armenian refugees who had become 
stateless. 
Surprisingly, in the midst of this growing doubt regarding the 
ability of the major powers to secure an independent nation for 
Armenian refugees, the United States Bureau of Naturalization 
renewed its challenge to the racial eligibility of Armenians for 
naturalization by filing its petition in Cartozian. Because by the time 
the case would be decided the Immigration Act of 1924 prohibited any 
                                                                                                       
(hereinafter Dadrian, The Turkish Military Tribunal’s Prosecution); see also The 
Turkish Military’s Prosecution, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1919. The Turkish Attorney 
General appointed to prosecute the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide in the 
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Tribunal’s Prosecution, supra, at 43. 
 44. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 331-47; see also SHAW, supra note 31; Richard 
G. Hovannisian, Confronting the Armenian Genocide, in PIONEERS OF GENOCIDE 
STUDIES 34 (Samuel Totten & Steven Leonard Jacobs eds., 2002). 
 45. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 331-47. In 1994, the Soviet Union granted 
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Armenia annexed by the Soviet Union after World War I. 
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alien “ineligible to citizenship” from entering the United States,46 the 
case would also ultimately decide Armenian eligibility for 
immigration. As a result, the Government’s decision to challenge 
Armenian racial eligibility for naturalization at this particularly 
vulnerable moment profoundly shocked the Armenian community. The 
Armenian weekly review Gotchag later wrote that the case was of 
great concern to all Armenians, “rich and poor, educated and 
uneducated, big and small,”47 and the Washington Post noted that it 
seemed “strange to raise the question of eligibility at this late hour.”48 
The move threatened many stateless Armenian refugees not only with 
the diplomatic abandonment of efforts to secure an independent 
Armenia but simultaneous exclusion by its greatest ally the United 
States, a combined set of conditions previously inconceivable to the 
Armenian community. It also forced the American Committee for an 
Independent Armenia to divide its energies between opposing the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne and defending the Cartozian 
case. 
The Government’s renewed challenge to Armenian racial 
eligibility for naturalization was apparently motivated by a desire to 
clarify conflicting rulings among lower courts after Armenian 
naturalization petitions increased during the postwar period and some 
lower courts began to interpret dicta in the United States Supreme 
Court’s opinion in United States v. Thind (1923) to indicate that 
historical residents of Asia such as the Armenians might be racially 
ineligible for naturalization regardless of other factors relevant to their 
racial classification. The Bureau of Naturalization’s official policy 
when Cartozian was filed was to take no action to question the racial 
eligibility of Asians other than the Chinese who were expressly 
rendered ineligibile for naturalization by the Chinese Exclusion Act 
and the Japanese who had been consistently held ineligible for 
naturalization by lower courts and ultimately by the Supreme Court.49 
                                                                                                       
 46. See 43 Stat. 153, §§ 13(c), 28(c) (1924). 
 47. See Craver, supra note 14, at 56; Lothyan, supra note 14, at 272. 
 48. The Status of Armenians, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1925, at 6. 
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As discussed above, prior to Cartozian the question of Armenian racial 
eligibility had been settled to the satisfaction of the Bureau of 
Naturalization by Halladjian, in which a federal district court in 
Massachusetts held four Armenian petitioners to be “white” and 
therefore racially eligible for naturalization.50 The Bureau of 
Naturalization adopted the holding of Halladjian and offered no 
objection to Armenian naturalizations until it became apparent that 
lower courts had begun to raise their own objections to Armenian 
eligibility despite the Bureau’s position.51 
After World War I, Armenian refugees began immigrating to the 
United States in greater numbers to escape religious persecution and 
genocide,52 and between 1920 and the time of the Cartozian trial 
Armenian petitions for naturalization had increased by sixty percent 
due in part to the Armenian genocide and the desire of many 
Armenians to secure passports to return and help loved ones abroad.53 
Although the defense in Cartozian argued that the “color line” had 
never been drawn against Armenians and that they readily assimilated 
with “white” Europeans and Americans, historical evidence suggests 
that Armenian immigrants suffered significant racism and xenophobia 
in the United States during the early twentieth century. In Fresno, 
California, for example, where a substantial Armenian immigrant 
community resided, the “white” establishment referred to Armenians 
                                                                                                       
aliens applying for citizenship came within the [racial eligibility] provisions of section 
2169” of the Naturalization Act). 
 50. See In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). 
 51. See, e.g., Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 141 (discussing March 7, 
1924 correspondence from Commissioner of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to M. 
Vartan Malcolm introduced into evidence during the trial). 
 52. Significantly, the first statutory protection of refugees was an exception to the 
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exemption under this provision, the record showed that “the Turks killed her father and 
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in a harem for 3 1/2 years, until she was saved by the Allied armies,” and that she 
pleaded that “‘if the government of the United States sends me back, I will throw 
myself overboard, as I have no place to go.’” Johnson v. Tertzag, 2 F.2d 40, 41 (1st 
Cir. 1924). 
 53. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 138, 141; see also Craver, supra 
note 14, at 56. 
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as “Fresno Niggers,” excluded them from churches and social centers, 
and prohibited them from owning or leasing land through restrictive 
land covenants.54 Armenians were also frequently excluded from 
American labor unions because they were regarded as “foreigners.”55 
The discrimination Armenians faced in communities like Fresno likely 
contributed to the growing questions regarding Armenian whiteness 
among lower courts. 
These growing racial tensions generated by increased Armenian 
immigration were further compounded by the United States Supreme 
Court’s opinion in United States v. Thind (1923), in which the Court 
commented in dicta that “there is much in the origin and historic 
development of the [Naturalization Act] to suggest that no Asiatic 
whatever was included” within the scope of the racial prerequisite in 
the Act.56 In both Thind and Ozawa v. United States (1922), decided a 
mere three months before Thind, the Court rejected scientific 
definitions of race as an interpretive index of the meaning of the racial 
prerequisites in the Naturalization Act and instead applied what is 
commonly referred to as the “ordinary usage” rule of statutory 
interpretation, according to which the words of a statute are to be 
interpreted according to their ordinary usage or “popular sense” unless 
a technical meaning is clearly indicated. Accordingly, the Court held 
that the words “white person” in the Naturalization Act should be 
interpreted as “words of common speech and not of scientific origin, . . 
. written in the common speech, for common understanding, by 
unscientific men.”57 The Court reached this holding in specific 
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response to the growing incidence of lower courts adopting the 
ethnographic classification of Caucasian as determinative of the 
meaning of the term “white” in the Naturalization Act. By applying the 
ordinary usage rule, the Court specifically rejected the ethnographic 
classification of Caucasian as an adequate definition of the word 
“white” except “in the popular sense of the word” or as it is “popularly 
known,” which according to the Court often diverged from its 
scientific definition.58 
Before the Court’s opinions in Ozawa and Thind, lower courts 
had examined numerous historical sources to discover the original 
intent of the phrase “white persons” in the minds of the First Congress 
and often split over whether the phrase should be interpreted 
affirmatively to include only those who the First Congress commonly 
considered “white” or negatively as a catch-all term that included 
everyone except those people who the First Congress specifically 
considered non-“white” (i.e., Africans and American Indians). Many 
early racial prerequisite courts reached the latter conclusion.59 Indeed, 
this interpretation was supported by numerous historical sources cited 
by early racial prerequisite courts but was ultimately rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Ozawa based on the conclusion that the affirmative 
form of the Naturalization Act and the petitioner’s burden of proof did 
not support such a definition: 
It may be true that [the African and American Indian] 
races were alone thought of as being excluded, but to say 
that they were the only ones within the intent of the 
                                                                                                       
precedent was expressly approved in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ozawa. See 
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1918). See also In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 
1003 (D. Or. 1910) (applying the ordinary usage rule to the racial prerequisite in the 
Naturalization Act); In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 127 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (same). See 
generally G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: 
FOUNDED ON THE TREATISE OF SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL 4 (Frederick D. Linn & 
Co., 1888). 
 58. See ENDLICH, supra note 57, at 197; Thind, 261 U.S. at 208-09. 
 59. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 349 (W.D. Tex. 1897) (“Indeed, it is a 
debatable question whether the term ‘free white person,’ as used in the original act of 
1790, was not employed for the sole purpose of withholding the right of citizenship 
from the black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this country.”). The 
petitioners and amici curiae in racial prerequisite cases also frequently argued this and 
similar arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1910) 
(“Counsel for certain Syrian interveners as amici curiae contend the words ‘free white 
persons’ were used simply to exclude slaves and free negroes.”). 
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statute would be to ignore the affirmative form of the 
legislation. The provision is not that Negroes and 
Indians shall be excluded but it is, in effect, that only 
free white persons shall be included. The intention was 
to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of 
persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it 
to all who could not be so classified. It is not enough to 
say that the framers did not have in mind the brown or 
yellow races of Asia. It is necessary to go farther and be 
able to say that had these particular races been suggested 
the language of the act would have been so varied as to 
include them within its privileges.60 
In this passage, the Court not only rejects the definition of whiteness as 
a catch-all term referring to everyone except those who the First 
Congress specifically considered non-“white,” but it assumes that most 
or all of the “races of Asia” were “brown or yellow” and not “white” 
within the meaning of the Naturalization Act, an erroneous assumption 
according to the historical evidence.61 
Courts interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Act also 
struggled to identify factors that might be used to determine whether 
petitioners should be classified as “white” or non-“white” within the 
meaning of the Act. Only a fraction of the published judicial opinions 
addressing the racial prerequisite were issued before 1909, and with 
one exception the opinions in the early cases are brief and primarily 
rely on the racial classification systems of the leading ethnological 
authorities of the nineteenth century such as Friedrich Blumenbach, 
George Buffon, Georges Cuvier, Thomas Huxley, Augustus Keane, 
and Carl Linnaeus, particularly the ethnographic classification of 
Caucasian which the Court ultimately rejected in Ozawa and Thind.62 
                                                                                                       
 60. See Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 195-96. Cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 420 (1857) 
(writing that the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act “would seem to have been 
used merely because it followed out the line of division which the Constitution has 
drawn between the citizen race, who formed and held the Government, and the African 
race, which they held in subjection and slavery, and governed at their own pleasure”).  
 61. For a detailed discussion of early descriptions of Chinese and Japanese people 
as “white” by Europeans and Americans, see KEEVAK, supra note 11. 
 62. See, e.g., In re Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878); In re Saito, 62 F. at 127; 
In re Po, 28 N.Y.S. 383 (N.Y. City Ct. 1894); In re Yamashita, 10 P. 482 (Wash. 
1902). For a discussion of the scientific evidence of race introduced in the early racial 
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As acceptance of racialist science began to decline in the scientific 
community after the turn of the twentieth century, however, many 
lower courts began to anticipate the conclusion that popular and 
scientific meanings of race could not be reconciled and turned to other 
means of defining race. Many of these courts openly recognized that 
race was socially, culturally, and historically constructed, one court 
even finding that “there is no European or white race, as the United 
States contends, and no Asiatic or yellow race which includes 
substantially all the people of Asia.”63 Some courts also recognized that 
whiteness was a highly contingent and negotiable political commodity 
and that judicial interpretations of the term “white” in the Act had at 
times been both broadened to include groups whose whiteness had 
once been unrecognized and narrowed to exclude groups whose 
whiteness had not previously been challenged.64 
The courts that reached the conclusion that racialist science was 
unreliable as a guide to interpreting the racial prerequisite in the 
Naturalization Act developed what was referred to as the “geographical 
test” of race, described as a commonality of geographical origin, blood, 
previous social and political environment, laws, usages, customs, and 
traditions, or a closely related test referred to as the “historical 
interpretation” of race, best exemplified by the Solicitor General’s 
argument that what constitutes a “white person” cannot be “wholly 
determined upon either geographical, philological, or ethnological 
                                                                                                       
prerequisite cases, see LÓPEZ, supra note 8, at 49-77. One notable exception to this 
early trend is In re Rodriguez, in which Judge Thomas Maxey wrote a lengthy opinion 
in support of his conclusion that Mexicans were “white.” See In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 
337. In Rodriguez, Judge Maxey carefully analyzes the racial classifications of early 
census forms and the history of treaties entered into by the United States to support his 
conclusion that Mexicans had never previously been classified as non-“white” or been 
denied citizenship on the basis of race. Id. at 349. Many early courts also considered 
complexion or skin color to determine whether a petitioner was “white” and referenced 
skin color as relevant to their conclusions; however, given its variability, the courts 
largely rejected the “utter impracticability” of such an index of race standing alone. See 
In re Singh, 246 F. 496, 497-98 (E.D. Pa. 1917). The United States Court for the 
Southern District of Georgia, for example, admitted a petitioner from Calcutta, India, 
whose parents were natives of Afghanistan, finding among other things that “the skin 
of his arm where it had been protected from the sun and weather by his clothing was . . 
. several shades lighter than that of his face and hands, and was sufficiently transparent 
for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly.” United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 
101, 102 (5th Cir. 1910). 
 63. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 845 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) 
 64. See, e.g., id.; In re Singh, 246 F. 496, 498-99 (E.D. Pa. 1917). 
2012] PERSECUTORY AGENCY IN THE RACIAL PREREQUISITE CASES 141 
 
bases,” but “can only be determined in the light of history” and 
included only “those peoples of the white race who, at the time of the 
formation of the government, lived in Europe and were inured to 
European governmental institutions, or upon the American continent,” 
who, “from tradition, teaching, and environment, would be predisposed 
toward our form of government, and thus readily assimilate with the 
people of the United States.”65 Courts adopting the “historical 
interpretation” of race relied on historical narratives rather than 
ethnological authorities to justify their racial classifications, often 
referencing authorities as old as the Hebrew and Christian scriptures as 
well as various historians, geographers, and travel writers from ancient 
Greece through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in lengthy 
discussions of the geographical, political, religious, and cultural 
histories of various racial groups from central and western Asia to 
determine if a particular petitioner was “white.”66 
Although the Supreme Court did not expressly adopt the 
“historical interpretation” of race in Thind, its adoption of this 
interpretation is suggested by the Court’s conclusion that the racial 
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act should be interpreted according 
to the ordinary or popular sense of racial classifications rather than 
scientific definitions of race and by two crucial findings that the 
defense directly responded to in Cartozian. The petitioner in Thind was 
a “high caste Hindu of full Indian blood” who advanced the Indo-
European invasion theory of Indian civilization originally developed by 
European scholars who concluded that Europeans and Asian Indians 
descended from a common “white” ancestor who invaded the Indian 
subcontinent prior to India’s Vedic era and conquered the darkskinned 
                                                                                                       
 65. Brief for the United States at 20, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) 
(No. 202). Cf. In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1003 (D. Or. 1910). 
 66. See, e.g., In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); In re Mozumdar, 
207 F. 115 (E.D. Wash. 1913); Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812 (E.D.S.C. 1913); In re 
Dow, 213 F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915); United States v. 
Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1944); In re 
S–-, 4 I & N. Dec. 104 (B.I.A. 1950); In re R–-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 1951). One 
judge even commented on the peculiarity of this form of writing in his opinion, noting 
that the lengthy genealogy of racial history in the opinion “may seem wholly out of 
place in a reasoned judicial opinion as to the construction of a statute, except as 
illustrating the Serbonian bog into which a court or judge will plunge that attempts to 
make the words ‘white persons’ conform to any racial classification.” In re Dow, 213 
F. 355, 364 (E.D.S.C. 1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915). 
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Dravidians of the region. Adding to this theory of Asian Indian origins 
another argument that circulated among Indian nationalists, the 
petitioner in Thind claimed that high caste Hindus were not only 
“white” by virtue of their descent from a premodern “white” ancestor 
but that due to the caste restrictions on marriage imposed by Hindu law 
they had preserved their racial purity to such an extent that they 
enjoyed a racial purity unparalleled even by European and American 
whites.67 In its opinion in Thind, the Court first rejects the idea that 
descent from “some remote, common ancestor” could determine a 
person’s present racial status, stating that “it may be true that the blond 
Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim 
reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that 
there are unmistakable and profound differences between them 
today.”68 The Court then adds that although Asian Indians may have 
descended from Indo-European invaders of the Indian subcontinent 
who were once “white,” their intermarriages with the darkskinned 
Dravidians of the subcontinent had rendered contemporary Asian 
Indians non-“white” in any ordinary or popular sense of the term. After 
dismissing the significance of an Indo-European ancestor, the Court 
then adds that contemporary Asian Indians are undoubtedly 
inassimilable with life in the United States, writing that while 
the children of English, French, German, Italian, 
Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly 
merge into the mass of our population and lose the 
distinctive hallmarks of their European origin, . . . it 
cannot be doubted that the children born in this country 
of Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear 
evidence of their ancestry.69 
The Court fails to explain this conclusion but merely asserts it as self-
                                                                                                       
 67. As Harold R. Isaacs writes, Asian Indians who internalized this theory often 
conceived themselves as “more ‘white’ than the ‘whites,’ indeed, as descendants from 
that ‘pure Aryan family’ of prehistoric times,” endowing them “with a sort of 
Mayflower status in relation to ‘whiteness.’” HAROLD R. ISAACS, IMAGES OF ASIA: 
AMERICAN VIEWS OF CHINA AND INDIA 290 (Capricorn Books ed. 1962). 
 68. Among other arguments offered in support of its opinion in Thind the Court 
notes that in 1790 the Adamite theory of creation, according to which all of humanity 
descended from a common ancestor, was generally accepted, and as a result any 
definition that relied on a remote common ancestor would render the statutory 
language meaningless. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 212-15 (1923). 
 69. Thind, 261 U.S. at 215. 
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evident, and consequently while the passage suggests some form of 
assimilability test as one means of interpreting the racial prerequisite in 
the Naturalization Act it is unclear what test of assimilability the Court 
intended. 
The Court’s opinion in Thind provides the most immediate 
precedent for Cartozian, and because the Court issued its opinions in 
Ozawa and Thind less than a year before Cartozian was filed, 
Cartozian also provides one of the earliest attempts by lower courts to 
interpret these important opinions of the Court regarding the racial 
prerequisites in the Naturalization Act. The Court’s opinions in Ozawa 
and Thind rejected the argument that contemporary descendants of an 
Indo-European ancestor were necessarily “white” within the ordinary 
usage of the term absent evidence that they remained assimilable with 
contemporary Europeans and the opinions suggested the Court’s 
endorsement of the “historical interpretation” of race that had 
developed during the previous decades. As discussed further below, the 
defense in Cartozian responded directly to these considerations by 
seeking to establish that unlike high caste Hindus, Armenians not only 
descended from a premodern European ancestor but remained 
assimilable with contemporary Europeans despite residing in Asia for 
centuries. To accomplish this, the defense embraced the “historical 
interpretation” of race and advanced a narrative of a uniquely rigid 
racial segregation in Asia Minor as evidenced by their historic 
persecution by the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims, a narrative that 
invoked the anti-Islamic sentiment of mythic battles between 
Christianity and Islam during the Crusades, popular epithets of the 
Armenians as the “Christian people of ancient Eden,” the “first people 
to embrace Christianity,” and “guides to the Crusaders,”70 and tensions 
between the United States and Turkey during the post-World War I era. 
 
THE CARTOZIAN TRIAL: A STORY OF PERSECUTION AND 
MARTYRDOM 
The transcript of the Cartozian trial preserved by the National 
Archives and Records Administration reveals a great deal about the 
conflicts and tensions in the case that are not evident in the published 
                                                                                                       
 70. KOOLAKIAN, supra note 42, at 23. 
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opinion.71 As Robert Ferguson writes, because trial transcripts reflect 
complete records of court proceedings in which everything that is said 
is spontaneously recorded, they reveal, “as nothing else quite can, the 
real preoccupations in the flow of legal argument,” supplying a better 
perspective for understanding “the formulation of story that lies at the 
center of all courtroom proceedings,” and 
if transcripts are decidedly more opaque, less accessible, 
and less dramatic than final opinions, they are richer in 
the range of commentary that they include, and they tell 
us much about the choices made in a final opinion. As 
complete records of court proceedings, transcripts 
register the conflict in the advocacy system in ways that 
a judicial decision ignores in the name of judgment.72 
In Cartozian, the transcript reveals the conflicts and tensions that faced 
Armenians during the postwar period and the defense’s rhetorical 
strategy of creating a powerful sense of social solidarity with 
Americans by portraying Turkey as a common enemy through a 
historical narrative of Turkish persecution of Armenians culminating in 
the Armenian genocide of World War I. The transcript also reveals the 
conflict between this rhetorical strategy and Armenians’ 
protonationalist aspirations, insofar as this strategy depended upon a 
negation of Armenian national identity that at times metaphorically 
echoed the eliminationist campaign the Armenians had recently 
suffered in the war, a conflict that highlights difficult identity issues in 
the case not evident in the judicial opinion. 
Significantly, correspondence between the lead counsel for the 
Armenian defense and the Department of Labor indicates that the 
Government repeatedly reassured concerned Armenians that the case 
                                                                                                       
 71. Because expert witnesses Paul Rohrbach, Roland Burrage Dixon, James Barton, 
and Franz Boas testified by deposition in the case, textual references to the transcript 
may alternatively or collectively refer to the transcript of evidence of the two-day 
bench trial held on May 8-9, 1924 in Portland, Oregon and to the transcript of expert 
depositions held between April 5-9, 1924. The transcript of these expert depositions 
was introduced as evidence during the trial and thus constitutes part of the trial record. 
The footnote citations identify whether one or both of these transcripts serve as a 
source for the textual content. 
 72. Robert A. Ferguson, Becoming American: High Treason and Low Incentive in 
the Republic of Laws, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 103, 103 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. 
Kearns eds., The Univ. of Mich. Press 1994). 
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was friendly.73 Apparently as a result, the Government presented 
virtually no opposition to Armenian racial eligibility for naturalization 
during the trial but rested its case after introducing only a small amount 
of documentary evidence and brief testimony regarding reports from 
the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the United States 
House of Representatives that classified Armenians as originating in 
“Turkey in Asia.”74 This stance is consistent with the Department of 
Labor’s policy, discussed above, of taking no position on the racial 
eligibility of individual naturalization petitioners but merely informing 
courts of the petitioner’s race and prior judicial precedent regarding the 
eligibility of people classified as belonging to that race. The 
Government otherwise relied on the position that the trial court and any 
appellate courts reviewing the case could take judicial notice of 
“historical, geographical and ethnological matters and works and 
authorities” to determine whether Armenians were “white,” a position 
with which Judge Wolverton and the defense agreed. Surprising as this 
conclusion may sound after decades of confusion regarding the 
meaning of the racial prerequisite in the Act, the Government appears 
                                                                                                       
 73. See, e.g., Correspondence from M. Vartin Malcolm to Commissioner of 
Naturalization Raymond Crist dated Jan. 8, 1924, in Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service of the United States, Record Group 85, Box 1573, File 
19783/43, National Archives Building, Washington, DC (writing that “we realize that . 
. . the suit commenced by the Government [in Cartozian] is friendly, and on every 
level I have heard the expression of the hope that we may and will win  . . . .”). 
 74. The Government introduced several reports of the Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization of the United States House of Representatives showing that 
Armenian immigration was categorized as originating from “Turkey in Asia,” George 
Washington’s statement in his Farewell Address to the American people that “with 
slight shades of difference, you have the same Religion, Manners, Habits, and political 
principles,” and a statement from John Quincy Adams’s writings expressing the 
expansionist doctrine of “manifest destiny,” writing that “the whole continent of North 
America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one nation, 
speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political 
principles, and accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs.” See 
Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 4 (referencing George Washington’s “The 
Farewell Advice of the Father of His Country” and John Quincy Adams’s “One Nation 
in North America”). The Government’s attorneys did not state what they found 
significant about these items, but they appear to support the Government’s argument 
that the racial prerequisite to naturalization was only intended to include Western 
Europeans, who from tradition, teaching, and environment would be predisposed 
toward the American form of government and readily assimilate with the American 
people. 
146 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 2 
to have taken the position that because the Supreme Court had 
effectively adopted the “historical interpretation” of race in Thind and 
the trial court could take judicial notice of historical facts, racial 
classification no longer required formal proof.75 Importantly, this 
position would have rendered the trial unnecessary, and although Judge 
Wolverton initially agreed that he would likely want to look at 
materials on racial classification outside of the record, he eventually 
declined to do so as reflected in a statement toward the end of his 
judicial opinion that “I have confined my investigation to the testimony 
in the record, and have made no attempt at independent investigation 
respecting race, color, assimilation, or amalgamation.”76 Thus, because 
the Government presented almost no evidence in the case and Judge 
Wolverton declined to take judicial notice of facts outside the record, 
the arguments and evidence presented by the Armenian defense 
provide the sole record from which the case was decided. 
The defense presented a tripartite case for Armenian whiteness 
within the meaning of the Naturalization Act: (1) Armenians 
descended from Indo-European ancestors who originated in Europe 
and migrated to Asia Minor in the seventh century B.C.E. in one of the 
many Indo-European invasions of central Asia, (2) unlike descendants 
of the Indo-European invaders of the Indian subcontinent who were 
rejected as non-“white” in Thind because they had intermarried with 
the darkskinned Dravidians of the subcontinent, Armenians had 
remained “white” due to a unique geographical, linguistic, and 
religious isolation in Asia Minor, and (3) Armenians readily 
assimilated with contemporary Europeans and Americans as evidenced 
by their Christianity, their proximity to the people of the Russian 
Caucasus region who were the original inspiration for the Caucasian 
racial classification, and numerous marriages of Armenians to 
Europeans and Americans. Because Armenians claimed whiteness 
through one of the many Indo-European invasions of central Asia like 
                                                                                                       
 75. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 8. Judicial notice allows courts 
to rely on the existence and truth of facts without the necessity of formal proof only 
when they are “universally regarded as established by common notoriety, e.g., the laws 
of the state, international law, historical events, the constitution and course of nature, 
main geographical features, etc.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990) 
(sub verbo “judicial notice”); see also A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 485 
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 2d ed. 1995) (sub verbo “judicial notice; judicial cognizance”). 
 76. United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 922 (D. Or. 1925). See also Cartozian 
Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 1-5. 
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the Asian Indian petitioner had in Thind, the greatest challenge for the 
defense was to distinguish their case from that of high caste Hindus 
which had been rejected in Thind. The defense primarily sought to 
accomplish this by first claiming that Armenians had remained isolated 
in Asia Minor due to their inassimilability with the Turks, Kurds, and 
Syrian Muslims of the region. To establish this the defense advanced a 
historical narrative that featured these Islamic groups as persecutors of 
the Armenian Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire and as 
perpetrators of the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s and the Armenian 
genocide of World War I, leaving the Armenians a displaced people 
who would become stateless if they were held ineligible for American 
citizenship. Second, the defense claimed that in contrast to their 
inassimilability with these groups Armenians were completely 
assimilable with contemporary Europeans and Americans. 
The argument that Armenians descended from a remodern 
“white” ancestor who originated in Europe and migrated to Asia Minor 
in the seventh century B.C.E. reflected what was known at the time as 
the “classical hypothesis” of Armenian origins. The defense supported 
this claim through the expert testimony of Columbia University 
anthropologist Franz Boas, Harvard ethnologist Roland Dixon, and M. 
Vartan Malcolm, author of The Armenians in America. These experts 
collectively cited a host of anthropological, archaeological, 
philological, geographical, historical, and travel authorities, beginning 
with the fifth century B.C.E. Greek historian Herodotus’s Histories and 
the first century B.C.E. Greek geographer Strabo’s Geography, to 
support the conclusion that Armenians descended from Phrygian 
colonists who migrated to Asia Minor from Europe and belonged to the 
Alpine subdivision of the Caucasian race.77 Significantly, although this 
                                                                                                       
 77. The works cited include: Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety 
of Mankind (M.D. thesis, University of Göttingen, first published in 1776); Friedrich 
Braun, The Aboriginal Population of Europe and the Origin of the Teutonic People; 
DANIEL BRINTON, RACES AND PEOPLES: LECTURES OF THE SCIENCE OF ETHNOGRAPHY 
(1890); ROLAND DIXON, THE RACIAL HISTORY OF MAN (1923); WYNFRID DUCKWORTH, 
STUDIES FROM THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL LABORATORY (1904); LOUIS FIGUIER, LES 
RACES HUMAINES (1873); MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1916); 
ALFRED HADDON, THE RACES OF MAN AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION (1909); JEAN BAPTISTE 
JULIEN D’OMALIUS D’HALLOY, DES RACES HUMAINES OU ELÉMENTS D’ ETHNOGRAPHIE 
(1845); JOHANN HEINRICH HÜBSCHMANN, ARMENISCHE STUDIEN (1883); Paul 
Kretschmer, Der nationale Name der Armenier Haik (1932); FELIX VON LUSCHAN, THE 
EARLY INHABITANTS OF WESTERN ASIA (1911); HENRY LYNCH, ARMENIA: TRAVELS 
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was the prevailing hypothesis of Armenian origins at the time, the 
defense exaggerated the reliability of the hypothesis, the racial 
homogeneity it reflected, and the marginality of competing hypotheses. 
The history of Armenian origins in Strabo’s Geography is not only 
laden with mythology but claims that Armenia was founded by the 
consolidation of a host of heterogeneous people from central and 
western Asia.78 Moreover, in M. Vartan Malcolm’s book The 
Armenians in America, written less than a decade before the trial, 
Malcolm acknowledges that some scholars identified the Armenians 
with the non-Aryan Hittites of the Bible.79 In one noteworthy example 
of the latter hypothesis, Mardiros Ananikian argues in the Mythology of 
All Races published at nearly the same time as the trial that the original 
inhabitants of the Armenian plateau, known as the Urartrians, belonged 
to the same non-Aryan and non-Semitic peoples as the Hittites.80 
                                                                                                       
AND STUDIES (1901); JACQUES DE MORGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE: 
FROM THE REMOTEST TIMES TO PRESENT DAY (1918); WILLIAM RIPLEY, RACES OF 
EUROPE (1899); OTTO SCHRADER, PREHISTORIC ANTIQUITIES OF THE ARYAN PEOPLES: A 
MANUAL OF COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AND THE EARLIEST CULTURE (1890); and 
GIUSEPPE SERGI, MAN, HIS ORIGIN, ANTIQUITY, VARIETY AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISTRIBUTION. See Transcript of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Roland Burrage Dixon, Dr. James 
L. Barton, and Dr. Franz Boas Deposition, United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D. 
Or. 1925) (No. E-8668), in Significant Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925, 
District of Oregon (Portland), Records of U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group 
118, National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, 
Wash. [hereinafter Cartozian Deposition Transcript]; Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra 
note 1, at 101, 128-29. 
 78. In the same chapter of The Geography that the defense cites, Strabo reports that 
the Armenians descended from Jason and Medea, a reference to the epic myth by 
which Jason, who was raised by a centaur, led the Greek Argonauts on a quest for the 
Golden Fleece which was guarded by a dragon that never slept. See STRABO, THE 
GEOGRAPHY OF STRABO 269 (H.C. Hamilton & W. Falconer trans., G. Bell & Sons, 
Ltd. 1913). Strabo also writes that the ancient origin of Armenia derives from Armenus 
of Armenium, who accompanied Jason in his expedition into Armenia, and that the 
Jasonia serve as proof of Jason’s expedition. See id. at 272; cf. THE READER’S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD LITERATURE AND THE ARTS 45, 555, 707 
(William Rose Benét ed., 1948). In addition to these mythic origins of the Armenians, 
Strabo notes in The Geography that Armenia was originally a small country enlarged 
by the conquest of surrounding areas, consolidating under one language an array of 
heterogeneous peoples. See STRABO, supra note 78, at 269, 273-74. 
 79. See MALCOLM, supra note 55, at 49. 
 80. See MARDIROS H. ANANIKIAN, THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES 7-8 (Canon 
John Arnott MacCulloch ed., 1925). According to Ananikian, the Armenians 
conquered the Urartians and reduced many to serfdom, imposing on them the 
Armenian name, language, religion, and civilization, such that “it is very natural that 
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Nevertheless, the “classical hypothesis” that Armenians descended 
from Indo-Europeans who migrated to Asia Minor from Europe was 
the prevailing theory of Armenian origins and endorsed by numerous 
authorities.81 
The defense then claimed that despite residing in Asia Minor for 
centuries, Armenians had remained “white” due to their religious 
isolation which had “preserved their individuality, their religion, and 
their national characteristics, as against the conquering Turks, more 
than probably any other people.”82 Harvard ethnologist Roland Dixon 
testified, for example, that the Armenians had maintained a remarkable 
homogeneity despite tremendous pressure from the Turks and other 
conquerors of the region, who were presumably racially Asian in 
origin: 
The Armenians retained their nationality and national 
characteristics against the tremendous pressure brought 
to bear upon them by these conquerors for many 
centuries. They were practically the first nation to be 
converted to Christianity, and they have retained their 
faith in the face of tremendous odds from the early 
fourth century to the present time.83 
Similarly, the defense asked Franz Boas to read the following 
                                                                                                       
such a relation should culminate in a certain amount of fusion between the two races.” 
Id. 
 81. In In re Halladjian, Judge Lowell probably offered the most accurate conclusion 
regarding Armenian racial origins, writing that like Europeans “the present inhabitants 
of western Asia have their racial descent so mixed that there are many individuals who 
cannot safely be assigned by descent to any one race, however comprehensive.” 174 F. 
834, 837-38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). Judge Lowell also wrote: 
Only where a people has remained without considerable emigration 
or immigration, substantially unmixed, in the same country for a very 
long time, do racial and geographical boundaries coincide. The 
inhabitants of no considerable part of Europe belong to a race thus 
unmixed. In what is called by analogy a “mixed race,” the cross must 
have been ancient, and the hybrid must have persisted without much 
later crossing. In nearly all Europe the mixture is not only ancient, 
but has continued to modern times, and even to the present day. 
Id. For an excellent study of how historians rhetorically constructed a single Anglo-
Saxon race out of a heterogeneity of races in Britain, see COHEN, supra note 25. 
 82. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 36; Cartozian Trial 
Transcript, supra note 1, at 103. 
 83. Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 35. 
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translated excerpt from Felix von Luschan’s work Die Tachtadschy, in 
which von Luschan wrote that the racial homogeneity of Armenians 
was unparalleled anywhere in the worldT 
the homogeneity of this people which is not found in 
equal or similar degree in any other civilized nation, is 
interesting because it shows that owing to the striking 
geographical, linguistic and religious isolation of 
Armenia during its development and florescence, the 
type has remained pure and has been consolidated to 
such an extent that even today, many centuries after the 
fall of the empire, it has remained almost entirely 
uniform.84 
Several witnesses also denied they knew of even a single instance 
when an Armenian married a Muslim or converted to Islam other than 
by forced conversion.85 When one witness was asked if he had ever 
known of any marriages between the Armenian race and the Turks or 
the Kurds, he replied, “I have never heard of it,” and when another was 
pressed on cross-examination regarding whether or not there were 
some Armenian Muslims he replied adamantly, “not one.”86 In this 
testimony and elsewhere in the trial transcript, the defense argued that 
unlike the Asian Indians of the Indian subcontinent, Armenians had 
retained their original “white” racial identity through the centuries due 
to a unique geographical, linguistic, and religious isolation. 
The defense claimed that this unparalleled isolation and racial 
purity was due to the inassimilability of Armenians with their Islamic 
neighbors as evidenced by a history of violent religious persecution 
suffered by the Armenians since their conquest by the Ottoman Turks, 
ultimately culminating in the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s and the 
Armenian genocide of World War I. This argument invoked deep 
historic prejudices between Christianity and Islam, which remain 
evident in the United States during the post-9/11 era87 but which were 
also a particularly powerful source of American identification with 
                                                                                                       
 84. Id. at 82; Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 103.  
 85. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 14-15, 17-18, 51-53, 66. 
 86. Id. at 17, 52. Similarly, Mrs. Floyd Lamson testified that she had never known 
of an Armenian woman who had married a Muslim. Id. at 66. 
 87. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 17, at 51-54; SALAH D. HASSAN, Arabs, Race and 
the Post-September 11 National Security State in MIDDLE EAST REPORT 224, 16-21 
(2002). 
2012] PERSECUTORY AGENCY IN THE RACIAL PREREQUISITE CASES 151 
 
Armenians during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
When American missionaries began arriving in the Ottoman Empire 
and establishing Christian missionaries and schools in the mid-
nineteenth century, the Christian communities in the United States 
developed a powerful religious identification with Armenians. As 
Judge Francis Cabot Lowell notes in Halladjian, in the European 
imagination Armenia was “continuously associated with the place and 
landscape of the Bible,” particularly Armenia’s national symbol, 
Mount Ararat, the site of God’s covenant with Noah in the biblical 
book of Genesis and located in Armenia by Renaissance 
cartographers.88 Recognizing this mythic power of Armenia in mid-
nineteenth century America, Walt Whitman wrote in his poem to the 
peoples of the world, “Salut au Monde,” in Leaves of Grass, 
You thoughtful Armenian pondering by some stream of the 
Euphrates! You peering amid the ruins of Nineveh! 
You ascending Mt. Ararat!89 
The Hamidian massacres of the 1890s were widely published in 
American headlines and had a profound impact on the American 
public, even prompting debate about military intervention in the region 
before the turn of the century.90 In part as a result of the sympathy 
generated by these massacres, the early twentieth century became an 
era of popular epithets about the Armenians, referring to them as the 
“Christian people of ancient Eden,” the “first people to embrace 
Christianity,” and “guides to the Crusaders.”91 The Armenians were 
also frequently called “the starving Armenians” in recognition of the 
                                                                                                       
 88. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). Renaissance 
 cartographers located the Garden of Eden and other sacred sites of biblical literature in 
or near Armenia. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 29-30. The Caucasian racial 
classification had also long centered around hypotheses about the location of Mount 
Ararat and the subsequent spread of Noah’s progeny. See KEEVAK, supra note 11, at 
74, 80. 
 89. WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 146 (Harold W. Blodgett & Sculley 
Bradley eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1965). 
 90. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at xix, 4, 10-11, 66-67, 207, 282-85, 345. On 
September 10, 1895, for example, decades before the Holocaust of World War II, a 
New York Times headline described the persecution the Armenians suffered during the 
Hamidian massacres as “Another Armenian Holocaust.” See Another Armenian 
Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, September 10, 1895. 
 91. KOOLAKIAN, supra note 42, at 23. 
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starvation that flowed from their treatment in the Ottoman Empire, and 
after a grassroots charity drive spread news of the Armenian genocide 
through this epithet, American children were often told to remember 
“the starving Armenians” when admonished to clean their plates.92 As 
President Herbert Hoover would later comment of the era, “the name 
Armenia was in the front of the American mind” and “known to the 
American schoolchild only a little less than England.”93 
As a result of this powerful identification with Armenians, 
Americans were deeply shocked by the Armenian genocide of World 
War I and the politics of denial that followed. In the immediate 
postwar period, numerous books and films about the genocide 
proliferated in the United States and worldwide. Most notably, in 1918, 
Henry Morgenthau’s memoirs of his service as American ambassador 
to Turkey were published under the title Ambassador Morgenthau’s 
Story to wide critical acclaim,94 including a lengthy chapter entitled 
“The Murder of a Nation” that recounts the horrific details of the 
Armenian genocide which Morganthau describes as “one of the most 
hideous chapters of modern history,”95 lamenting that “the whole 
history of the human race contains no such horrible episode.”96 The 
same year Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story was published, the epic 
drama of Aurora Mardiganian’s struggle to survive her forced march 
across Anatolia was published as a book and adapted to silent film 
under the title Ravished Armenia, depicting the terror of genocide on 
the screen for the first time.97 Through these and other cultural 
representations of the Armenian genocide that proliferated in the 
postwar era, the shock and trauma of the events was still fresh in the 
American mind at the time of the Cartozian trial. 
Although the events are not specifically referenced in the judicial 
opinion in Cartozian, the trial transcript reveals that the Hamidian 
massacres of the 1890s and the more recent Armenian genocide of 
World War I were frequently discussed during the trial. Two Armenian 
                                                                                                       
 92. See BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 75, 291. 
 93. HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: YEARS OF ADVENTURE 
1874-1920, at 385 (The MacMillan Co. 1951). 
 94. See HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU’S STORY 301-25 
(1918). 
 95. Id. at 305. 
 96. Id. at 322. 
 97. BALAKIAN, supra note 41, at 314-17. 
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witnesses testified that they and their parents had escaped from Turkey 
during the Hamidian massacres to seek refuge in the United States,98 
M. Vartan Malcolm testified that Armenians came to the United States 
in larger numbers during the 1890s because of the sympathy that the 
American missionaries showed to them, noting that “from that time on 
these people have come here because of their religious persecution by 
the Turks and because they found friends among the American 
missionaries in Turkey,”99 and Malcolm testified that the reason for the 
dramatic increase in Armenian applications for naturalization in the 
United States since 1920 was that Armenians, particularly bachelors 
“whose parents have been driven out of their home land through the 
last Turkish massacres and the war needed a passport and other 
protections to go back and find their lost loved ones.”100 In addition, 
James Barton, foreign secretary of the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions who headed the relief expedition 
in Turkey after World War I, referenced the Turkish deportations of 
Armenians during the war.101 The end of M. Vartan Malcolm’s 
testimony on the first day of the trial he explained to Judge Wolverton 
that although President Wilson had awarded Armenia territory for an 
independent republic of Armenia in the Treaty of Sèvres it no longer 
existed and “today the entire Armenian people are scattered all over the 
Near East, and the possibility of Armenians going back to the old 
country is absolutely dead.”102 When Judge Wolverton asked him if the 
Armenians had any governmental organization in Turkey, Malcolm 
explained, “we have no Armenia, your Honor,” “there is no Armenia 
now,” adding, 
I must state that we lost a million Armenians during the 
war. There were before the war four million Armenians 
in all the world. We lost one quarter of the entire 
population. No other nation has lost so many as the 
Armenians. And there are now in all the world about two 
and a half million Armenians, and most of them are in 
the Caucasus. They took refuge there in order to save 
                                                                                                       
 98. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 19, 56-57. 
 99. Id. at 101-04. 
 100. Id. at 138. 
 101. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 46. 
 102. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 153-54. 
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themselves.103 
When asked if Syria was more populated than Armenia, another 
witness responded “well, certainly, because the Armenians have been 
decimated in their numbers, and scattered broadcast.”104 The defense 
emphasized that as a consequence of these conditions, if their 
citizenship were denied or revoked the Armenian refugees would be a 
stateless people, a “people without a country.”105 
The defense also specifically represented the Armenians as 
religious martyrs who suffered Turkish persecution because they would 
not recant their Christian faith,106 often reiterating the claim that the 
Armenians were “the oldest Christian nation” and had remained devout 
in their Christian faith through the centuries.107 Numerous witnesses 
testified to the positions of Armenians in Christian churches in 
Armenia, Europe, and America, including a number of witnesses who 
were ministers, pastors, or Sunday school teachers, and the defense’s 
tabulation of hundreds of responses to a questionnaire distributed to 
Armenian American men lists detailed Christian affiliations for most of 
the respondents.108 Paul Rohrbach testified of how Armenians in 
                                                                                                       
 103. Id. at 155. 
 104. Id. at 18. Likewise, after being asked if the Syrians had not suffered similar 
treatment, M.B. Parounagian testified that only one part of Syria had suffered similar 
persecution but “only I know about the Armenian race and their persecution, their 
sufferings.” Id. As indicated in the epigraph at the beginning of this article, this witness 
also testified that Armenians never married Turks unless it was “by force” and 
Armenians never adopted Islam except “for force, perhaps, they have been made, 
during the massacres, to save their lives.” Id. at 17-18. 
 105. Because an Armenian who left Turkey forfeited his personal and property rights 
and the Turkish government would not issue a passport to him, he would be unable to 
travel without an American passport. See, e.g., Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 
1, at 68, 130-31. As one witness testified, “we are a people with no country, and it is a 
great privilege for every Armenian to call America as their own country.” Id. at 72. 
 106. This was a familiar narrative regarding Armenian history in the Ottoman 
Empire. In an article published in The New Armenia shortly before Cartozian, for 
example, Herbert Lee wrote that “when . . . we remember that these [Armenians] were 
slain because they would not deny Christ, may we not assert that here is the supreme 
call to every Christian in the world?” Herbert Powell Lee, Armenia as the Measure of 
Our Civilization, THE NEW ARMENIA, Sept.-Oct. 1921, at 67-69; cf. KENNETH BURKE, 
A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 222 (1950) (“Martyrdom [bearing witness] is so essentially 
rhetorical, it even gets its name from the law courts.”). 
 107. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 14. 
 108. See id. at 11-12, 20-21, 38-40, 42, 44-46, 56, 62, 81, 84, 89, 98, 114, 117, 166. 
See also Defendant’s Exhibit listing “names, addresses, occupations, the maiden name 
of those that are married, citizenship, membership and affiliation with native American 
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Venice and Vienna belonged to the Armenian church, described as “a 
very old branch of Christendom,” even detailing how the Armenian 
monasteries in Venice and Vienna had “very large libraries and a very 
noted printing office” used for “the most difficult printing work in the 
eastern language of Europe,”109 and James Barton testified that the 
Armenians were “pastors of our churches” and everywhere 
“recognized as a Christian race.”110 The defense also emphasized that 
Armenians retained their Christian faith by withstanding “the onslaught 
of Mohammedanism,” or as Roland Dixon testified, “against 
                                                                                                       
fraternal, educational, religious, and social institutions, of 339 persons of Armenian 
parentage, now residing in all parts of the United States, and who are engaged in 
business and in some professions,” United States v. Cartozian, No. E-8668 (D. Or.), in 
Significant Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925, District of Oregon (Portland), 
Records of U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group 118, National Archives and 
Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, Wash. [hereinafter Cartozian 
Tabulation Exhibit]. 
 109. Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 12-13. 
 110. Id. at 54-55. The defense’s reliance on Armenian Christianity as evidence of 
whiteness follows a frequent theme among racial prerequisite cases during the early 
twentieth century of associating whiteness with Christianity. See, e.g., United States v. 
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213 (1923) (using the biblical allusion “bone of their bone and 
flesh of their flesh” to describe those European immigrants who the First Congress 
intended by the phrase “white persons”); In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1909) (noting that “by reason of their Christianity, [Armenians] generally ranged 
themselves against the Persian fire-worshipers, and against the Mohammedans, both 
Saracens and Turks,” that when the Armenians were conquered by the Saracens in the 
seventh century they recovered their independence in the ninth century under princes 
who they claimed “were of the lineage of David,” and that when the Armenians were 
finally conquered in Armenia by the Turks, their refugees set up an independent state 
in Cilicia “streaming the ensign of the Christian cross against black pagans, Turks, and 
Saracens”); In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1003 (D. Or. 1910) (noting that a Syrian petitioner 
was “reared a Catholic, and is still of that faith”); In re Dow, 213 F. 355, 364 (E.D.S.C. 
1914), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915) (writing that the modern inhabitant of the 
Lebanon District of Syria in which a Syrian petitioner was born was not the location 
either of the Old Testament or “the labors of Christ”); In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 
845 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (canceling the naturalization certificate of an Arab petitioner 
based on the conclusion that Arabs were “part of the Mohammedan world and that a 
wide gulf separates their culture from that of the predominately Christian peoples of 
Europe”). Of course, the association of whiteness and Christianity also has a long 
history in Western imperialism. See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 212.; RUBIN 
FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL 
ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893-1946, at 39 (1st ed. 1972); ROBERT 
A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 14-15, 21, 46-47 (1990). 
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tremendous pressure” and “in the face of tremendous odds” due to their 
persecution by the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims of Asia Minor.111 
Finally, in even more explicit terms the defense appealed to anti-
Islamic sentiment by explicitly framing Armenian Christianity as 
superior to the Islamic faith of the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims 
of Asia Minor. The attorneys for the Armenian defense repeatedly 
exploited the epithet of Armenians as “guides to the crusaders” by 
asking witnesses what effect the Crusades had on the Armenians,112 
and one witness attributed the downfall of the last kingdom of Armenia 
to the fact that “Armenians had given all of their men protectors and a 
great deal of the resources of their country” to the European 
crusaders.113 Other witnesses testified that “the social conception of 
Mohammedans is that a woman is a chattel; the Christian conception of 
a woman is that she is the equal of the man,” that unlike the monogamy 
practiced by Armenians “the Mohammedan is permitted to have four 
wives, legal wives, and as many concubines as his pocketbook will 
permit,” and that Armenians and Christian civilization were “entirely 
superior to the Mohammedan faith” and “superior to the Mohammedan 
ideals.”114 
The defense’s representation of Islam as an inferior religion and 
its association of Christianity with whiteness and Islam with “black 
pagans, Turks, and Saracens”115 is disturbing on many levels, but 
                                                                                                       
 111. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 126-27; Cartozian Deposition 
Transcript, supra note 77, at 35. 
 112. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 36, 88. 
 113. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 67. 
 114. See MALCOLM, supra note 55, at 14, 51-52, 137. M. Vartan Malcolm claimed 
that Syrians did not have the word “home” in their language because a Syrian 
Muslim’s wife and children did not dwell with him, but were kept apart. Id. at 137. The 
Armenian defense also argued in their brief that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Thind 
suggesting that “no Asiatic whatever” may be eligible for naturalization was based in 
large part on the congressional debates regarding the Naturalization Act in 1870 and 
1875 in which congressmen opposed to removing the racial prerequisite from the Act 
emphasized their concern that the Chinese, whom they sought to exclude, were a 
“pagan people.” The Armenian defense argued that the 1870 and 1875 debates, 
however, suggested “no intention whatever to exclude the Armenians, a Christian 
people living in Asia Minor.” See Brief for Defendant at 14-20, United States v. 
Cartozian, 6 F. 2d 919 (D. Or. 1925) (No. E-8668), in Civil and Criminal Case Files, 
District of Oregon (Portland), Records of the District Courts of the United States, 
Record Group 21, National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Alaska 
Region, Seattle, Wash. 
 115. See Richard II, supra note 30; In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 
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particularly when considered in light of the fact that Armenian efforts 
to achieve a “white” status by representing Turks, Kurds, and Syrian 
Muslims as non-“white” for purposes of naturalization was a dubious 
legal conclusion at the time. Although the Supreme Court’s dicta in 
Thind that “no Asiatic whatever” might be racially eligible for 
naturalization provided an opportunity for litigants to advocate that 
certain groups from the Middle East were racially ineligible for 
naturalization, most authorities had held that Turks, Syrians, and Arabs 
were “white” within the meaning of the Naturalization Act and 
continued to until the racial prerequisites were repealed in 1952.116 In 
                                                                                                       
1909). 
 116. Although John Tehranian argues that in the history of the racial prerequisite 
cases only “occasionally, and by the slimmest of margins, [were] Middle Easterners . . 
. considered white,” this conclusion references only the published judicial opinions in 
the cases and is debatable even with reference to those. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 17, 
at 49. There is ample evidence that Middle Easterners were more frequently considered 
“white” within the meaning of the Naturalization Act, and the Bureau of Naturalization 
had an official policy of not opposing the naturalization of Arabs and other petitioners 
from the Middle East almost from the inception of the Bureau in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. See, e.g., When “White” Is Not White, THE STATE, Oct. 20, 1909 
(reporting that a number of Turks employed in Indiana factories had been naturalized); 
“Free Whites” From Turkey, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1909 (reporting that Judge Arthur 
L. Brown of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island admitted 
Jacob Thompson, a “subject of the Sultan of Turkey and a native of Armenia,” to 
citizenship over the government’s objection, stating that “it has been the practice of 
this court for many years to recognize Armenians and Turks as coming within the 
designation of free white persons, and the court will continue so to consider them until 
a court of higher authority decides otherwise”); Internal Correspondence from the 
Acting Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor to Messrs. O’Brien, et al. 
dated Nov. 15, 1909, in Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the 
United States, Record Group 85, Box 1573, File 19783/43, National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC (reporting that “the records of the Department show but 
three cases in which courts have held Syrians are not white persons” and including a 
table of the cases); In re Najour, 174 F. 735 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909) (holding that a Syrian 
“from Mt. Lebanon, near Beirut” was a “white person”); Correspondence from 
Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor Charles Nagel to Secretary of 
State Philander Knox dated Dec. 7, 1909, in Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service of the United States, Record Group 85, Box 1573, File 
19783/43, National Archives Building, Washington, DC (writing that “neither the 
Department [of Commerce and Labor] nor the Division of Naturalization has requested 
that appeals be taken in any of the cases” in which Syrians applicants had been held to 
be “white” and therefore racially eligible for naturalization); In re Halladjian, 174 F. at 
845 (noting prior naturalizations of Armenians “as well as Syrians and Turks,” who 
had all been “freely naturaliz[ed] in this court until now”); In re Mudarri, 176 F. 465 
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1909, after the Chief of the Naturalization Division of the Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization claimed that “Turks, peoples of the 
Barbary states and Egypt, Persians, Syrians, and ‘other Asiatics’” were 
not “white” in statements restrictively interpreting the racial 
prerequisite to naturalization, the interpretation was almost 
immediately withdrawn after it met with vigorous objection not only 
from the Ottoman Empire but from the State Department and the 
Department of Justice, and Secretary of Commerce and Labor Charles 
Nagel later wrote in correspondence that he had taken immediate steps 
to ensure “a discontinuance of any aggressive measures” by the 
Government against these groups.117 Similarly, after a federal district 
court canceled the naturalization certificate of an Arab petitioner in 
1942 based on the conclusion that Arabs were “part of the 
                                                                                                       
(C.D. Mass. 1910) (holding that a Syrian “born in Damascus” was a “white person”); 
In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002 (D. Or. 1910) (holding that a Syrian who was “a native of the 
province of Palestine” and “a Turkish subject” was a “white person”) (cited with 
approval in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922)); Dow v. United States, 
226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915) (holding that a Syrian was a “white person” and that “a 
large number of Syrians have been naturalized without question,” reversing Ex Parte 
Dow, 211 F. 486 (E.D.S.C. 1914) and In re Dow, 213 F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914) (on 
rehearing)), In re Sallak, No. 14876 (N.D. Ill., East. Div., June 27, 1924), in 
Significant Civil and Criminal Case Files, 1899-1925, District of Oregon (Portland), 
Records of U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Record Group 118, National Archives and 
Records Administration Pacific Alaska Region (holding that a petitioner “born in 
Palestine” was a “white person”); In re S–-, 1 I & N Dec. 174 (B.I.A. 1941) (holding 
that a native and citizen of Iraq, whose parents were “full-blooded Arabians” and 
whose ancestors “came from Turkish stock” was a “white person”); INS, The 
Eligibility of Arabs for Naturalization, MONTHLY REV., October 1943, at 12, 12-16 
(concluding that persons of “the Arabian race” are “white persons”); INS, Summaries 
of Recent Court Decisions, MONTHLY REV., Jan. 1944, at 12 (reporting a January 13, 
1944 ruling of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
that “an Arab born in Beit Hanina, Palestine” was a “white person”); In re Shaikhaly, 
Nat. Case No. 119332 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1944), in Folder 119332, Contested 
Naturalizations, Southern District of California, Central Division (Los Angeles), 
National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Region (holding that “a native 
and citizen of Palestine . . . of the Arabian race,” was a “white person”); In re K–-, 2 I 
& N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 1945) (holding that a native and citizen of Afghanistan, “of the 
Afghan race,” was a “white person”). 
 117. Correspondence from Charles Nagel to Justin S. Kirreh dated November 13, 
1909, in Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States, 
Record Group 85, Box 1573, File 19783/43, National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC; see Aliens Refused Naturalization, supra note 31; Turkey Will Protest, supra note 
31; A. Rustem Bey, supra note 31; Race Row Up To Courts, supra note 31; Conflicting 
Views Taken of Asiatic Exclusion, supra note 31; Way Paved for Syrians, GRAND 
FORKS DAILY HERALD, Dec. 15, 1909. 
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Mohammedan world and . . . a wide gulf separates their culture from 
that of the predominately Christian peoples of Europe,” both the 
Bureau of Naturalization and later courts quickly repudiated the 
decision, noting that it had long been the administrative policy of the 
United States not to object to Arab naturalizations.118 In Halladjian, 
Judge Lowell forcefully rejected the Government’s claim that “the 
Turks have never commingled with Europeans, nor can it be said with 
any truth that they are descendants of Europeans,” noting instead that 
“for many centuries the Turks have ruled in Europe and Asia over 
Christians of many names, and have employed Christians for many 
purposes,” and that “the Turks, indeed, both socially and sexually, 
commingled with Europeans to an unusual degree.”119 Furthermore, 
President Wilson formally recognized Syrian American citizenship 
when he signed a presidential proclamation encouraging Americans to 
make donations to the American Red Cross to help Armenians and 
Syrians stricken during World War I, writing in his proclamation that 
“thousands of citizens of the United States in practically every State of 
the Union were either born in Syria or are the children of Syrians born 
in that country.”120 As these sources reflect, the majority of both 
executive and judicial authorities concluded that Middle Easterners 
were “white” and therefore eligible for naturalization, a fact neither the 
Armenian defense nor the Government addressed during the Cartozian 
trial. Instead, the Armenian defense simply adopted the useful fiction 
that Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims were not “white” and were 
therefore racially ineligible for naturalization as a foil against which to 
establish Armenian whiteness by virtue of the segregation of these 
respective groups in Asia Minor. 
This fiction raises a number of difficult questions about the 
defense in Cartozian, the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, 
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the racial prerequisite in 
Ozawa and Thind. If the Armenians were as inassimilable with Turks, 
Kurds, and Syrian Muslims as they claimed and these groups were also 
                                                                                                       
 118. Compare In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1942), with In re S–-, 
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160 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 2 
“white” and eligible for naturalized citizenship, not to mention 
birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, did the 
defense actually prove that Armenians were inassimilable with early 
twentieth century America? The defense’s central premise was that 
Christianity determined not only their assimilability with Western 
whites but their inassimilability with Asian racial groups through an 
indissoluble link between whiteness and Christianity, and the defense 
frequently heralded the claim that Armenia was the first nation to make 
Christianity a national religion. The First Amendment prohibits the 
establishment of a national religion in the United States, however, and 
although Christianity has been a dominant strain in American religious 
history since the nation’s earliest beginnings, American religious life 
was significantly more diverse by the early twentieth century.121 As 
mentioned earlier, numerous courts held that petitioners from Islamic, 
Zoroastrian, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist religious backgrounds were 
“white” and therefore eligible for naturalized citizenship, not to 
mention the children born to these and other religious groups who 
became citizens by birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
By emphasizing an indissoluble link between whiteness and 
Christianity in their effort to establish that they were not truly “Asian,” 
the defense ironically cast doubt on Armenian assimilability with non-
Christian whites in the United States. This problem also extends to the 
defense’s reliance on the prospect of Armenian statelessness to create 
sympathy for their cause. Could the Allied abandonment of Armenian 
aspirations for an independent nation have signified the conclusion that 
Armenians did not truly belong to the West? One writer complained 
that “instead of extending protection to Armenia as to all of the other 
Allied nations, the Allies abandoned Armenia to her enemies” after 
World War I, and that American Christians were washing their hands 
of the Armenian suffering because “they, and the enemies of Armenia, 
denounce a Union of Church and State.”122 The defense’s effort to 
create a religious identification with American Christians had already 
failed during the postwar negotiations for an independent republic of 
Armenia for reasons that could have also doomed their claim of racial 
eligibility for naturalization in the United States. 
In addition, although the rhetorical strategy of the defense 
                                                                                                       
 121. See generally, e.g., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY 52-53 
(Edward L. Queen II et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009). 
 122. Lee, supra note 106, at 69. 
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succeeded in securing a favorable ruling in the case it also reflects what 
Kenneth Burke calls the “paradox of purity” or the “paradox of the 
absolute,” implicit in “any term for a collective motivation, such as a 
class, nation, the ‘general will,’ and the like,” where the collective 
motive only becomes a “pure” by negating any individual motive.123 
The defense could only prove that Armenians had retained their racial 
“purity” despite residing in Asia for centuries by establishing that they 
had remained in a state of proportionately “pure” isolation from the 
Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims. The defense sought to establish this 
through a narrative in which Armenians were represented as the 
passive victims of religious persecution by these Islamic neighbors, a 
narrative that suggests the ritual purification through violence that is 
the epitome of martyrdom.124 By connecting Armenian racial identity 
to this persecutor-victim conflict, Armenian racial “purity” was made 
proportionate to the negation of Armenian national agency, in effect 
claiming that the more pure the persecution the more pure the race. As 
Sam Keen writes of political propaganda, “he who projects the power 
and responsibility for doing evil onto the enemy loses the ability to 
take initiative, to act,”125 and in the defense’s narrative Armenians are 
represented with little or no power to act but instead are represented as 
passive victims of Turkish persecution. This highlights an important 
aspect of the rhetorical strategy of unifying against a common enemy 
and may even be crucial to its effect. Social psychologists have noted 
the relationship of this phenomenon to the willingness of men to deny 
their individual interests and sacrifice themselves on behalf of their 
group, for example, and the relationship between persecutory agency 
and the paradox of purity is close because the unification that is the 
goal of the strategy requires the negation of one or more of the 
individual groups that merge to form the new unity.126 
                                                                                                       
 123. See KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 35-38 (California ed. 1969). 
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Significantly, the absolutism that results from this sort of paradox 
is evident not only in the defense’s claim that Armenians were 
absolutely inassimilable with the Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims of 
Asia Minor, but in its corresponding claim that Armenians were 
absolutely assimilable with contemporary Europeans and Americans. 
In support of the latter claim, the defense offered a wealth of evidence 
including Armenians’ proximity to the people of the Caucasus region 
of southwestern Russia who formed the original inspiration for the 
Caucasian racial classification, Armenian Christianity and support for 
Europeans during the Crusades, marriages between Armenians and 
contemporary Europeans and Americans, statistical evidence regarding 
prior Armenian naturalizations in the United States, and evidence of 
Armenian membership in American churches and professional, civic, 
and fraternal organizations.127 The defense also offered evidence that 
                                                                                                       
CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL STUDIES 588-91 (2001) (sub verbo “transcendence”); 
Vugt et al., supra note 24, at 22. 
 127. See, e.g., Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 9-15, 19-24, 26-29, 47-50, 
56-95, 64-66, 99, 104-27, 136; Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 5-
11, 36-37, 52-55, 90-93. In presenting this evidence of assimilability, the defense went 
to particularly extraordinary lengths to establish that Armenians had been freely 
admitted to numerous “whites only” fraternal organizations such as the Freemasons, 
the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, the Independent Order of Foresters, the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles, the Modern Woodmen of America, the Loyal Order of 
Moose, the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, and the Knights of Pythias. See 
Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, a-d, 104; United States v. Cartozian, 6 F. 2d 
919 (D. Or. 1925); see also Craver, supra note 14, at 56. The defense not only offered 
evidence that Armenians were members of these organizations, but presented 
testimony from organizational officers of the Freemasons, the Benevolent and 
Protective Order of Elks, the Loyal Order of the Moose, the Independent Order of Odd 
Fellows, and the Knights of Pythias regarding the racial prerequisites for membership 
in their groups, even introducing the constitution and statutes of the Benevolent and 
Protective Order of Elks into evidence. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1. 
The Deputy Grand Master of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, for example, 
testified that the Odd Fellows admitted Armenians but excluded Chinese, Japanese, 
and Hindus from membership on racial grounds. Id. at 36-38. The defense also elicited 
testimony from the Deputy Grand Master that the whiteness of Syrians for purposes of 
Odd Fellows membership had been “adjudicated” within the organization and found to 
be white. Id. The admission of evidence regarding fraternal racial prerequisites and 
private adjudications of whiteness within these organizations raises particularly 
interesting questions about the relationship between private dispute resolution and 
public law in Cartozian. It is also noteworthy that the defense continued to adopt the 
rhetorical strategy of unifying against a common enemy in conjunction with these 
direct forms of assimilability evidence. For example, the defense frequently noted 
Armenian military service both in the Spanish American War and in World War I in 
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Armenian immigrant communities in Europe and America did not form 
enclaves but readily interspersed with the native European and 
American populations, however, and this testimony often took a 
particularly disturbing turn, using metaphors of disappearance, loss, 
and consumption in support of a claimed assimilation so absolute that 
it suggested a continuation of the eliminationist campaign the 
Armenians had only recently escaped in the war. When asked about 
Armenian “colonies” in Europe, for example, M. Vartan Malcolm 
testified that an Armenian colony in Lemberg, Poland that had once 
numbered approximately 200,000 Armenians had become assimilated 
into the Polish population to such an extent that when he visited 
Lemberg a decade before the trial he found “no trace” of the Armenian 
colony there with the exception of “the great buildings which these 
Armenians had built, and the names of the streets in a certain section of 
the town,” because “the entire colony had disappeared by assimilating 
with the native population.”128 Similarly, Malcolm testified that the 
oldest Armenian colony in Europe, which was in Holland, “has 
disappeared, and there are no traces of it left,” that an Armenian colony 
in Marseilles, France, too, “has disappeared,” and that Armenian 
colonies in Italy and England “have been lost within the native 
                                                                                                       
connection with such assimilability evidence. See Cartozian Tabulation Exhibit, supra 
note 108. The defense highlighted the fact that some of the respondents belonged to the 
national guard and state defense corps, that several were draft board examiners, and 
that others supplied medical and legal advice to draft and exemption boards during the 
war. See id. Other respondents worked in support of the Liberty Bond campaign, one 
was a Four Minute Man appointed by President Wilson to speak in support of 
America’s participation in World War I, and another was a War Work Secretary of the 
Y.M.C.A. See id. Judge Wolverton also expressed interest in the question of Armenian 
military service. During the testimony of Martin Fereshetian, for example, Judge 
Wolverton interjected to ask the witness if he had been in the war, and when the 
witness replied that he was exempt but had asked to serve anyway, Judge Wolverton 
asked the witness to confirm that he had not claimed an exemption on account of his 
nationality. See Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 23. The defense also 
repressed evidence of significant racial discrimination and xenophobia toward 
Armenians in the United States during this period. See, e.g., BOBELIAN, supra note 54, 
at 110. The transcript reflects several references to Fresno, California as the 
Government sought to highlight the well-known racial discrimination toward 
Armenians there, and Judge Wolverton asked a witness if she knew what proportion of 
the Armenians living in Fresno had been admitted to American citizenship. See 
Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 24-25, 72. 
 128. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 96. 
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populations.”129 Franz Boas read from a French writer explaining that 
the Armenians had probably not “played an important part in [French] 
national history and demography” because immediately upon their 
arrival they “submerged themselves in the great French family” and 
were “devoured” by the French nation.130 Similarly, one Armenian 
witness testified that as soon as Armenians learned to speak English, 
they immediately separated from each other and became “very readily 
consumed in American life.”131 
The language of this testimony suggests particularly extreme 
claims of assimilation, an assimilation as absolute as the eliminationist 
campaigns such as the Armenian genocide of World War I. This 
testimony suggests that the assimilability of Armenians was considered 
proportionate to the “decay” of Armenian immigrant communities in 
Europe and the United States,132 and the metaphors of disappearance, 
loss, and consumption not only reflect the continued elimination of the 
Armenian identity elsewhere praised as so resilient to eliminationist 
efforts but negates Armenian national agency by representing 
Armenians as passive objects in this process of assimilation much like 
their agency is negated by their representation as passive victims of 
Turkish persecution. As Richard Hovannisian remarked to the 
Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal during its session on the Armenian 
genocide in 1985, one result of the Allies’ failure to establish an 
independent republic of Armenia during the post-World War I period 
was a life of exile and dispersion for Armenians, who were “subjected 
to inevitable acculturation and assimilation on five continents and 
facing an indifferent and even hostile world that preferred not to 
remember.”133 The defense’s rhetorical strategy in Cartozian not only 
reflects the acceptance of this fate, but by denying Armenians’ 
frustrated protonationalist aspirations the defense denies the suffering 
brought by the forced acculturation and assimilation that is often a 
continuing harm of genocide. As Primo Levi writes of the Holocaust of 
World War II, “we had not only forgotten our country and our culture, 
but also our family, our past, the future we had imagined for ourselves, 
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because, like animals, we were confined to the present moment.”134 
The absolute assimilability that the defense sought to establish in 
Cartozian reflects a metaphorical continuation of the eliminationist 
campaign directed at Armenian history, culture, and identity, and while 
this conflict was largely avoided during the trial it clearly emerged 
during the final hours of testimony. 
The conflict between Armenian protonationalism and the absolute 
assimilability of Armenians with Europeans and Americans becomes 
most apparent during the final hours of the trial when the 
Government’s attorney cross-examines M. Vartan Malcolm about his 
1919 book The Armenians in America, where in stark contrast to his 
unqualified endorsement of Armenian assimilability with Americans 
during his testimony in Cartozian he writes that Armenians are less 
than entirely assimilable to American life.135 In one passage of the 
book, for example, Malcolm states that “an independent Armenia will 
naturally attract many Armenians who are now in the United States” 
because Armenians “have no home here” and would long to return to 
their birthplace in Armenia which they could never forget. In other 
passages, Malcolm claims that “as a rule Armenians marry within their 
own race” and warns Armenian men against marrying American 
women. Elsewhere he cites among the reasons Armenians should 
return to Armenia the fact that they had been excluded from American 
trade unions because they were regarded as “foreigners” and that their 
ignorance of the English language and American customs would lead 
to nothing but frustration if they remained in America.136 When the 
Government’s attorney confronts Malcolm with the contradiction 
between such passages and his assertions that Armenians were entirely 
assimilable to American life, Malcolm explains frankly that he had 
written Armenians in America in connection with the Paris Peace 
Conference and the negotiations of the United States and other Allied 
powers for the independent republic of Armenia President Wilson had 
promised. Malcolm explains that all of that changed after the plan for 
an independent Armenia had failed, and he acknowledges that the 
purpose of his book had been argumentative: 
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What I say there does not mean that the Armenians are 
not faithful and good citizens of America, but that the 
Armenian colony in America would furnish some 
material which, in some measure, would help to build up 
an Armenian state, and help to improve conditions in the 
East and to make a better world and less war.137 
This exchange highlights the difficult identity issues facing Armenian 
refugees during the postwar period and the conflict between the 
frequent Armenian testimony of assimilability offered to satisfy the 
requirements of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Thind and the 
protonationalist aspirations that had grown doubtful at the time of the 
Cartozian trial. The paradoxical position reflected in the defense’s case 
reveals this tension in a way the judicial opinion ignores and illustrates 
the problems that evidence of assimilability presented in the racial 
prerequisite cases. 
 
THE “HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION” OF RACE AND THE 
PROBLEM OF NARRATIVITY IN JUDGE WOLVERTON’S OPINION 
Judge Wolverton did not issue his opinion in Cartozian until July 
27, 1925, more than a year after the trial. Judge Wolverton had been a 
judge for thirty years at the time of the Cartozian trial, having been 
appointed to the federal bench in 1905 by President Theodore 
Roosevelt after serving more than a decade on the Oregon Supreme 
Court, and Judge Wolverton had already issued two significant 
opinions interpreting the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act. It 
was Judge Wolverton’s district court opinion that the Supreme Court 
had recently reversed in Thind,138 and a decade earlier he published an 
opinion in In re Ellis holding that a Syrian petitioner was “white” and 
therefore racially eligible for naturalization.139 In Ellis, Judge 
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Wolverton had relied almost exclusively on the Government’s 
admission that the petitioner was “white” but rejected the 
Government’s argument that the racial prerequisite in the Act did not 
include all whites but only those people of the “white race” who at the 
time the Naturalization Act was passed either lived in Europe or on the 
American continent and were “inured to European governmental 
institutions.” Judge Wolverton briefly cited Daniel Brinton’s Races 
and Peoples, Augustus Keane’s The World’s Peoples, and Joseph 
Deniker’s The Races of Man and noted that from these sources the 
Government’s attorney admitted that the petitioner was “a member of 
what is known as the white or Caucasian race.”140 In Thind, Judge 
Wolverton relied on previous lower court precedent, citing cases 
holding that Armenians, Asian Indians, and Parsis were “white” within 
the meaning of the Act as particularly illustrative.141 Beyond these 
precedents, Judge Wolverton offered no other authorities to support his 
decision in Thind. 
In Cartozian, Judge Wolverton did not have the opportunity to 
adopt the approach he had taken in either Ellis or Thind. Instead, he 
adopted the defense’s theory of the case in its entirety, although as 
discussed below, Judge Wolverton’s opinion manifests a marked 
absence of narrativity that raises intriguing questions about his 
response to the “historical interpretation” of race that had recently 
emerged in case law interpreting the racial prerequisite in the 
Naturalization Act. The defense’s tripartite case for Armenian racial 
eligibility for naturalization discussed above provides the basic 
structure of Judge Wolverton’s opinion: (1) Armenians descended from 
premodern “white” ancestors who originated in Europe and migrated to 
Asia Minor in the seventh century B.C.E., (2) Armenians had remained 
“white” due to their unique geographical, linguistic, and religious 
isolation in Asia Minor, and (3) Armenians readily assimilated with 
contemporary Europeans and Americans (although with regard to this 
third part of the argument Judge Wolverton places greater emphasis on 
Armenia’s proximity to and alliance with the Russian people of the 
Caucasus region who were the original inspiration for the Caucasian 
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racial classification than on the other assimilability evidence cited in 
his opinion). 
Judge Wolverton begins his defense of Armenian whiteness in the 
opinion with the foundational premise that Armenians belonged to the 
Alpine subdivision of the Caucasian race, beginning this section of his 
opinion with the simple declaration, “That the Armenians are of Alpine 
stock can scarcely be doubted.” He then lists numerous authorities 
supplied by the defense to support this classical hypothesis of 
Armenian descent from Europeans who migrated to Asia Minor in the 
seventh century B.C.E., citing Herodotus’s Histories, Strabo’s 
Geography, Daniel Brinton’s Races and Peoples, William Ripley’s 
Races of Europe, Henry Lynch’s Armenia, Travels and Studies, and 
Alfred Haddon’s The Races of Man and Their Distribution, as well as 
the testimony of Franz Boas and Roland Dixon.142 Judge Wolverton 
uses curiously hyperbolic language to defend this hypothesis, writing 
that “all the evidence points to” the European origins of Armenians, 
that the continuity of the Alpine race across Asia Minor “cannot be 
doubted,” that the authors and writers relied on by Boas and Dixon are 
“entirely reliable” and their conclusions have been accepted “without 
hesitation,” and that the evidence is so overwhelming that “nobody 
doubts” it.143 With this language, Judge Wolverton ignores and perhaps 
even seeks to suppress the alternative hypotheses of more 
heterogeneous Armenian origins discussed in Judge Lowell’s opinion 
in Halladjian and M. Vartan Malcom’s book The Armenians in 
America. 
After advancting this foundational premise, Judge Wolverton 
then offers his version of the historical narrative that justifies his 
finding that the Armenians not only descended from a premodern Indo-
European ancestor but had remained “white” despite residing in Asia 
for centuries through their unique geographical, linguistic, and 
religious isolation. In contrast to the detail given this narrative by the 
Armenian defense, however, Judge Wolverton reduces this narrative to 
the following two sentences in the Cartozian opinion: 
Although the Armenian province is within the confines 
of the Turkish Empire, being in Asia Minor, the people 
thereof have always held themselves aloof from the 
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Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be 
said, on account of their religion, though color may have 
had something to do with it. The Armenians, tradition 
has it, very early, about the fourth century, espoused the 
Christian religion, and have ever since consistently 
adhered to their belief, and practiced it.144 
Unlike Judge Wolverton’s conclusion that the evidence of Armenians’ 
descent from Indo-European ancestors is so overwhelming that 
“nobody doubts it,” this passage is fraught with doubt and hesitation 
and reflects a markedly ambiguous agency at the center of the 
narrative. 
The most significant language in this passage is the phrase “held 
themselves aloof,” particularly the word “aloof.” By condensing the 
defense’s historical narrative of Islamic persecution and martyrdom in 
Asia Minor into the brief statement that the Armenians “held 
themselves aloof” from the Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples of the 
region, Judge Wolverton introduces an ambiguity regarding the agency 
in the narrative that suggests an inability or unwillingness to clarify it. 
The Armenians are given the active voice in this passage, but are they 
also given the active agency?145 Who is doing what to whom in Judge 
Wolverton’s account? Did the Armenians discriminate against the 
Turks, vice versa, or both, and who was to blame for the rigid 
segregation between the two groups? This was, after all, a significant 
historical question at issue in the case. Much of the testimony had 
addressed whether or not the Armenian communities in Europe and the 
United States formed enclaves, leading the defense to make such 
strong claims of Armenian assimilability with contemporary Europeans 
and Americans as that Armenian colonies in Europe and America had 
left “no trace” of themselves or been “devoured” or “consumed” by the 
local populations. Moreover, one of the familiar claims of genocide 
denial is that the perpetrators are the real victims because the killing 
was committed in self-defense and the perpetrators also suffered 
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casualties. With regard to the Armenian genocide, Turkey claimed that 
Armenians were separatists who provoked the atrocities against them 
by forming alliances with foreign powers and that the genocide of 
World War I was justified by the fact that Armenians joined Russian 
forces during the war to form a “fifth column” inside the Ottoman 
Empire.146 The ambiguity of the word “aloof” in the Cartozian opinion 
suggests a deliberate evasion of this central question of who was 
responsible for the isolation of Armenians from the Turks, Kurds, and 
allied peoples in Asia Minor. 
The word “aloof” originally derives from “a loof,” a combination 
of the preposition “a,” referring to motion toward a position of contact, 
and the noun “loof,” referring to the palm of the hand. The combined 
form “a loof” came to refer to the injunction to a rudder operator of a 
ship to “keep your loof” in the act of turning the ship toward the wind 
and clear of the direction where it might otherwise drift. From this 
arose the sense of “steering clear of,” or “giving a wide berth to” 
anything with which one might otherwise come in contact, as in the 
exhortation to “keep aloof.” The word may also describe a lack of 
sympathy or community with a person or group, in the sense of 
someone who stands “coldly aloof” from others.147 The latter meaning 
is more often associated with the verb “hold,” or alternatively “stand” 
or “keep,” as in the phrases, “stood aloof,” “kept aloof,” “held aloof,” 
or Judge Wolverton’s phrase “held themselves aloof.” This sense of 
“aloof” may even refer to a person ignoring pleas of help or 
appeasement, as in the final act of Shakespeare’s Hamlet when Laertes 
tells Hamlet “I stand aloof, and will no reconcilement,”148 or may 
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suggest a resistance offered to temptation, echoing its earlier use as an 
injunction to turn a ship toward the wind so that it does not drift. 
This tension between those who “hold themselves aloof” and the 
group denied sympathy or community by this action creates a 
remarkably ambiguous representation of agency. What is the nature of 
the relationship between the Armenians and their Islamic neighbors in 
Asia Minor in this narrative? How does it explain centuries of 
Armenian isolation despite the close proximity to these people? Have 
the Armenians “held themselves aloof” for fear of being massacred or 
of being seduced (either religiously or sexually)? Judge Wolverton 
adds that the Armenians held themselves aloof based “principally . . . 
on account of their religion, though color may have had something to 
do with it,” an explanation that further compounds the ambiguity of the 
passage rather than clarifies it. The unequivocal claim that the 
Armenians “always” held themselves aloof from these people was 
necessary to distinguish the case from Thind, yet the certainty of the 
claim is almost immediately contradicted by the hesitation of merely 
claiming that “it might be said” that this isolation was principally due 
to religion but that color “may” have had “something” to do with it.149 
Moreover, the trial record reflects no discussion of “color” having 
anything to do with the relationship between the Armenians and the 
Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples of Asia Minor, at least not explicitly. 
Are the Turks, Kurds, and allied people of Asia Minor persecutors or 
victims in this passage? What does the answer reflect about Armenian 
assimilability in the diverse population of early twentieth century 
America? The passage leaves these questions unanswered. 
At almost the same time as the trial in Cartozian, the word 
“aloof” also appears in United States v. Pandit, a racial prerequisite 
case in which the Government sought to cancel the naturalization 
certificate of Asian Indian immigrant Sakharam Pandit after the 
Supreme Court held that high caste Hindus were racially ineligible for 
naturalization in Thind. In what appears to have been a novel strategy 
in the racial prerequisite cases, Pandit had argued that the Government 
                                                                                                       
 149. The second sentence of the quoted passage from the Cartozian opinion reflects 
a similar juxtaposition of certainty and hesitation, claiming “tradition has it” that in 
“about” the fourth century Armenians adopted Christianity but have “ever since 
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was equitably estopped from canceling his naturalization certificate 
because among other things he had lost his high caste status in India 
when he became an American citizen and if his naturalization 
certificate were canceled he would be an outcast in India and a stateless 
person. When an expert witness testified in an evidentiary hearing that 
a high caste Hindu who became an American citizen would lose his 
high caste status in India, Judge Paul McCormick interrupted the 
witness to ask if Brahmins in India exercised rights as British subjects, 
adding, “I mean, do they do it because of necessity or through choice? 
Does the Brahmin as a caste, the Hindu caste, hold itself aloof from the 
rest of the citizenry and accept the political status simply because they 
have to accept it?”150 In this question, Judge McCormick uses “aloof” 
in a phrase nearly identical to Judge Wolverton’s in Cartozian, but in 
the context of asking whether a Brahmin’s exercise of his rights as a 
British subject was voluntary. Judge McCormick’s use of “aloof” in 
Pandit leaves no ambiguity; for the Brahmin caste to “hold itself aloof” 
in the context of Judge McCormick’s question is unmistakably an act 
of choice. 
A different use of “aloof” appears in a 1951 opinion of the United 
States Board of Immigration Appeals holding that the Kalmyk people 
of southeastern European Russia, although originally “a tribe of 
Mongolian stock” and Asiatic in origin, were “white” within the 
meaning of the Nationality Act of 1940 by virtue of their identification 
with Europeans by several generations of affinity, education, cultural 
activity, and several decades of Soviet rule in Russia. In the course of 
limiting the scope of its opinion, the Board carefully distinguishes the 
Kalmyks of southeastern European Russia to whom the opinion refers 
from the Kalmyks who migrated east to China in 1771, because unlike 
the former group of Kalmyks the latter “stayed aloof from the 
neighboring Russian and non-Russian tribes” out of “fear of Russian 
Tsarist influence and domination.”151 This use of “aloof” suggests a 
passive or reactionary agency as the Kalmyks fled the Russian Tsar, 
perhaps even suggesting that they were chased or driven. Like Judge 
McCormick’s use of “aloof” in Pandit, the agency in the Board’s use 
                                                                                                       
 150. Transcript of Record, United States v. Sakharam Ganesh Pandit, No. 4938 (9th 
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of “aloof” is relatively clear, although the agency lies as much with the 
Tsar as with the Kalmyks. By contrast to these examples, however, the 
agency of Judge Wolverton’s claim that the Armenians “held 
themselves aloof” from the Turks, Kurds, and allied peoples of Asia 
Minor remains unclear. 
Studies of the racial prerequisite cases that focus exclusively on 
the direct evidence of assimilability discussed in Judge Wolverton’s 
opinion in Cartozian also neglect the fact that a close reading of the 
opinion reveals that he only relies on evidence of Armenian marriages 
to contemporary Europeans and Americans, prior Armenian 
naturalizations and membership in American social clubs, and 
Armenian use of the English language to corroborate a more figurative 
argument regarding Armenians’ affiliation with the Russian people of 
the Caucasus region of southwestern Russia. Specifically, after 
advancing his extraordinarily condensed version of the defense’s 
historical narrative, Judge Wolverton argues that Armenians are 
assimilable with contemporary Europeans and Americans based on the 
geographical and political proximity of Armenians to the Russian 
people of the Caucasus region who originally inspired the Caucasian 
racial classification, an argument Judge Wolverton notes is one of 
analogy: 
Whatever analogy there may be or may exist between 
the Caucasian and the white races that may be of 
assistance in the present controversy, the alliance of the 
Armenians with the Caucasians of Russia has ever been 
very close. Indeed, the Armenians have for many 
generations, possibly centuries, occupied territory in 
Caucasian Russia, have intermingled freely and 
harmoniously with that people, and the races mix and 
amalgamate readily and spontaneously.152 
                                                                                                       
 152. Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 920. Judge Wolverton’s use of the word “spontaneously” 
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The prominence given this argument in Judge Wolverton’s opinion 
significantly outweighs the emphasis placed on it by the defense. 
Although during Franz Boas’s testimony he quoted a passage from 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s On the Natural Variety of Mankind in 
which Blumenbach explains that he named the Caucasian racial 
classification after Mount Caucasus because he considered the people 
of that region “the most beautiful race of men” and “the autochthones 
of mankind,”153 the trial transcript is otherwise entirely silent on the 
etymology of the Caucasian racial classification. Furthermore, the only 
testimony regarding the Armenian alliance with the Russian people of 
the Caucasus region came when M. Vartan Malcolm testified that the 
Armenians took refuge in the Caucasus to save themselves from the 
Armenian genocide of World War I.154 Judge Wolverton’s metonymic 
claim that Armenians’ proximity to and affiliation with the Russian 
people of the Caucasus region demonstrated that Armenians were 
“white” is also curious in light of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
Caucasian racial classification as an index for the meaning of the racial 
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, unless Judge Wolverton believed 
the metonymic association supplied evidence of the ordinary or 
popular meaning of the term “white.” 
Although prior studies of Cartozian have largely focused on the 
evidence of Armenian marriages to contemporary Europeans and 
Americans, prior Armenian naturalizations and membership in 
American social clubs, and Armenian use of the English language 
referenced toward the end of the Cartozian opinion, it is significant 
that Judge Wolverton first emphasizes the claim that Armenians are 
metonymically “white” by virtue of their association with the Russian 
people of the Caucasus. Moreover, after making this argument Judge 
Wolverton pauses to state that “the status of the [Armenian] people 
thus evolved is practically conclusive of their eligibility to citizenship 
in the United States, seeing that they are of Alpine stock, and so remain 
                                                                                                       
belief in racial instincts developed into the argument that the truths of race did not need 
scientific verification but could be learned from “intuition.” See, e.g., THOMAS F. 
GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 353 (New ed. 1997); WILLIAM 
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instincts also appears to be the basis for the defense’s theory of the case in Cartozian, 
Judge Wolverton’s claim that Armenians “spontaneously” intermingled with other 
“whites” is the most explicit statement of this theory in the record. 
 153. See Cartozian Deposition Transcript, supra note 77, at 66. 
 154. Cartozian Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 155. 
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to the present time, without appreciable blending with the Mongolian 
or other kindred races.”155 Contrary to prior scholarly emphasis on the 
assimilability evidence in the latter half of the opinion, Judge 
Wolverton clearly indicates his satisfaction with the evidence discussed 
at this earlier point in the opinion as “practically conclusive” of the 
question. He only catalogues additional assimilability evidence after 
remarking, “but to pursue the inquiry further, it may be confidently 
affirmed that Armenians are white persons, and moreover that they 
readily amalgamate with the European and white races.”156 He then 
catalogues testimony and statistical evidence introduced by James 
Barton, Franz Boas, Roland Dixon, Mrs. Otis Floyd Lamson, M. 
Vartan Malcolm, and Paul Rohrbach regarding Armenian assimilability 
with contemporary Europeans and Americans, including statistical 
evidence introduced by Boas and Malcolm.157 
When Judge Wolverton’s opinion in Cartozian is considered as a 
whole, it is also apparent that his condensed narrative of Armenian 
isolation in Asia Minor is not the only passage in which the agency of 
the events depicted is ambiguous, but the opinion generally fails to 
clarify the agency in the events described and attributes virtually no 
agency to Armenians. Judge Wolverton represents the Armenians as a 
people whose origins are shrouded in mythology, migrate from Europe 
to Asia Minor, then “hold themselves aloof” from dark Islamic hordes 
until they are driven out of the region and consumed by the populations 
of Europe and the United States. In the Cartozian opinion, the 
Armenians truly are a people without a country because they have no 
national agency. The absence of a clear agency in the opinion also 
forms part of a larger pattern of narrative refusal manifested in a lack 
of transitional words and phrases in the opinion, any clear framework 
linking the beginning and ending of the opinion, or a coherent order of 
meaning in which the relationships between events are ordered into a 
purposive sequence. While the opinion depends on a particular 
historical account of Armenian isolation from their Islamic neighbors 
in Asia Minor, the account of this isolation is presented with virtually 
no narrative development, which is also lacking in the rest of the 
opinion. Instead, the sections before and after the historical account 
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read more like a catalogue of evidentiary items with no explanation of 
the relationship between them and no recognition of their contested 
nature. 
This absence of narrativity in the Cartozian opinion is 
particularly interesting because it suggests the form of natural history 
that Hayden White attributes to annals in contrast to fully developed 
histories. In his essay “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation 
of Reality,” White argues that unlike a fully realized history, annalists 
show no concern for any system of human morality or law but present 
“a world in which things happen to people rather than one in which 
people do things,” a world in which events “appear to belong to the 
same order of existence as the natural events which bring either ‘great’ 
crops or ‘deficient’ harvests, and are as seemingly 
incomprehensible.”158 Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
racialist science in Thind, the stylistic choices reflected in the 
Cartozian opinion suggest a world of biological determinism, and in 
this sense Judge Wolverton’s opinion suggests a continued 
ambivalence about the “historical interpretation” of race that had 
recently emerged in the case law. Throughout the opinion, Judge 
Wolverton introduces rhetorical appeals to scientific authority and 
statistical evidence in close proximity to the historical narratives on 
which the opinion most centrally relies, as though the certainty of 
science might compensate for the contingency of histories steeped in 
mythology, tradition, and figurality. 
What is perhaps most remarkable about the judicial opinion in 
contrast to the trial transcript in Cartozian, however, is the opinion’s 
deafening silence regarding the Armenian genocide and the resulting 
displacement of Armenians that gave rise to the case in the first place 
and the threat of statelessness the case posed were Armenians denied 
eligibility for naturalization to the United States. Even in Halladjian, 
written years before the Armenian genocide of World War I, Judge 
Lowell wrote that since the Armenians’ final conquest by the Turks 
they had been “oppressed by the Turks, and have looked vainly to 
Europe for relief.”159 As is apparent from the Cartozian trial transcript, 
the violent persecution of the Armenians by Turks, Kurds, and Syrian 
                                                                                                       
 158. HAYDEN WHITE, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in 
THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL 
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Muslims was a central theme of the defense’s case, offered to explain 
why Armenians remained “white” despite centuries of residence in 
Asia while Asian Indians had not remained “white” in the Indian 
subcontinent. Judge Wolverton was clearly presented with an exigency 
to speak to this issue, but neglects to even allude to it in his opinion. 
This raises particularly difficult questions given the silences that have 
attended many genocides and the Armenian genocide in particular, 
which was long referred to as the “forgotten genocide,” the 
“unremembered genocide,” the “hidden holocaust,” or the “secret 
genocide.”160 Is Judge Wolverton’s silence and the absence of a clear 
narrative in the Cartozian opinion a part of this legacy of silences 
surrounding genocide? 
As the first genocide in modern history, the Armenian genocide 
left spectators as well as survivors with a powerful feeling of 
speechlessness, the sense that they were confronting an event for which 
there were not yet words. As one writer attempted to describe it during 
the postwar period, 
Those bodies endured the most frightful physical 
suffering possible to human flesh and nerves—more than 
your imagination can conceive after reading all the 
horrors of Indian torture; of shipwreck and starvation in 
open boat or on desert island; of famine and pestilence in 
India or China; of being lost on the trackless desert; of 
being mangled and burned in a wreck of railroad train or 
of theater or of home; or of tortures by Inquisition or by 
Roman Empire. All that you have experienced or 
witnessed or read or heard of pain and horror pales 
before the dreadful realities of Armenian famine and 
massacre.161 
This author’s effort to negatively define these traumatic experiences by 
reference to the horrors that they surpass has now become a 
commonplace of genocide discourse, and genocide has often posed 
such unique challenges to speech that silence is considered the only 
appropriate response to it. In his study of the oral narratives of 
Holocaust survivors, Lawrence Langer concludes that the frequent 
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refusal of Holocaust survivors to speak of their trauma is sometimes 
motivated by an “anxiety of futility,” the certainty that those who most 
need to understand will not understand and may even be alienated by 
the incomprehensibility of the events. Because such events dispel the 
idea that choice is “purely an internal matter, immune to circumstance 
and chance,”162 they contest the notion of autonomous agency on which 
law, narrative, and history depend and even the concept of narrativity 
itself, a view perhaps suggested by Theodor Adorno’s statement that to 
write poetry after Auschwitz would be barbaric.163 Perhaps Judge 
Wolverton found that the only appropriate response to the history of 
violence at the heart of the defense’s historical narrative was silence or 
that the history of this violence was so incomprehensible as to defy 
narratativity. The answer to this question is ultimately unknowable, but 
the problem of narrativity in the context of genocide offers a possible 
explanation of the broader narrative refusal reflected in the Cartozian 
opinion. 
 
TRANSCENDING RACIAL DIVISIONS BY UNIFYING AGAINST 
COMMON ENEMIES 
The Department of Labor initially moved to appeal Judge 
Wolverton’s decision in Cartozian to the Supreme Court but agreed to 
drop the appeal after the change of administrations following President 
Harding’s death brought opposition to any appeal.164 The record of the 
proceedings in Cartozian not only offers the most detailed record 
available of the arguments and evidence advanced to determine 
whether a particular petitioner was “white” within the meaning of the 
racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, but is one of the earliest 
cases to have interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinions regarding racial 
eligibility for naturalization in Ozawa and Thind. The record in 
Cartozian reveals that the defense used a rhetorical strategy of unifying 
against a common enemy, invoking both cultural memories of the 
Crusades and the Mongol invasions of medieval Europe reflected in the 
legends of merciless slaughter committed by such figures as Attila the 
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Hun, Genghis Kahn, and Tamerlane,165 as well as contemporary 
tensions between the United States and Turkey arising out of World 
War I and continued Turkish aggression toward Armenians and 
American missionaries. The trial transcript in Cartozian also reveals 
the conflict between the assimilability that the Armenians claimed with 
contemporary Europeans and Americans and their protonationalist 
desire for an independent republic of Armenia that had become 
doubtful by the time of the trial, a conflict not evident in the judicial 
opinion but which highlights the difficult identity issues at the center of 
the case. 
Since Benedict Anderson’s groundbreaking work on nationalism 
in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, in which Anderson claims the nation is only an “imagined 
political community,”166 numerous studies have followed of the ways 
in which national identity is rhetorically constructed. As M. Lane 
Bruner writes, national identities are negotiated through “the clash of 
multiple and conflicting discourses, including battles over memory, 
over domestic and foreign policy, and over constitutions and the 
meaning of laws,” battles in which contradictory aspects of national 
history are erased or suppressed through narrative omissions to create 
the false appearance of a heterogeneous history.167 Importantly, studies 
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of nationality have frequently compared and contrasted national 
identity with race and religion, the imagined communities that the 
nation displaced. Thus, Anderson writes that in western Europe the 
eighteenth century “marks not only the dawn of the age of nationalism 
but the dusk of religious modes of thought” and that nationalism “has 
to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it,” 
specifically those religious communities and dynastic realms “out of 
which—as well as against which—it came into being.”168 Similarly, 
Maurice Olender notes the indelible mark left on the twentieth century 
by eighteenth and nineteenth century philologists whose search for the 
origins of human language linked philology with the preeminence of 
particular races, religions, and nations, and whose emphasis on the 
declining importance of race in favor of linguistic and religious 
identities eventually rendered race “a matter of language, religion, 
laws, and customs, more than of blood.”169 The conflicts between these 
competing forms of group identity are powerfully revealed in the racial 
prerequisite cases of the early twentieth century, particularly those 
cases adopting the “historical interpretation” of race, and Cartozian 
illustrates how such identities were forged through the rhetorical 
strategy of unifying against common enemies. 
This rhetorical strategy is not unique to Cartozian or to the 
historiography of the early twentieth century racial prerequisite cases, 
but expressions of solidarity against common enemies are found 
throughout the legislative, executive, and judicial discourse 
surrounding the racial prerequisites in the Naturalization Act, 
suggesting that many of the participants in this discourse found the 
strategy particularly persuasive of racial classification. In the earliest 
interpretation of the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act by the 
United States Supreme Court, for example, Chief Justice Roger Taney 
wrote in his infamous majority opinion in Dred Scott that in drafting 
the original Naturalization Act, while the First Congress could have 
provided for the naturalization of American Indians, “in their untutored 
and savage state no one would have thought of admitting them as 
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citizens in a civilized community,” and 
moreover, the atrocities they had but recently committed, 
when they were allies of Great Britain in the 
Revolutionary War, were yet fresh in the recollection of 
the people of the United States, and they were even then 
guarding themselves against the threatened renewal of 
Indian hostilities. No one supposed then that any Indian 
would ask for, or was capable of enjoying, the privileges 
of an American citizen, and the word white [in the 
Naturalization Act] was not used with any particular 
reference to them. 
Furthermore, although Justice Taney acknowledges that American 
Indians were not constitutionally incapable of becoming citizens but 
simply not contemplated by the original Act’s racial prerequisite, to 
support his contrary conclusion that Africans were constitutionally 
incapable of becoming citizens he writes that while American Indian 
governments were deemed foreign they were also free and “their 
alliance sought for in war.” Moreover, amidst a lengthy body of 
evidence that Justice Taney cites in support of the majority’s decision 
in Dred Scott, he lends particular emphasis to the fact that Africans 
were racially ineligible to fight in defense of the states under state 
militia laws, noting that “nothing could more strongly mark the entire 
repudiation of the African race” than its ineligibility to fight in defense 
of the states because “he forms no part of the sovereignty of the state, 
and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it.”170 
Other courts concluded that judicial interpretations of the racial 
prerequisite in the Act had broadened as a result of the Revolutionary 
War and the various annexation treaties of the nineteenth century in 
which the United States naturalized the inhabitants of annexed 
territories without regard to race. One federal judge wrote regarding 
the period when the First Congress drafted the original Naturalization 
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Act, for example: 
As the inhabitants of what was then the United States 
were a more or less homogeneous people who or whose 
immediate forbears had come from what has been 
termed “Northern Europe,” and as the vast territories 
then known as Florida and as Louisiana formed no part 
of our national domain, and as our people had been in 
almost continuous conflict with the French and 
Spaniards, it is doubtful whether the words “white 
persons,” as used in common speech, originally included 
any of the so-called Latin races. The events of the 
Revolution, however, and the gratitude which our people 
felt toward France, and more especially the large number 
of French Huguenots who had come to make their 
homes here, caused instant recognition of the French as 
having a common heritage with us, and the phrase 
automatically expanded to include them.171 
Similarly, in an opinion holding that a “pure-blooded Mexican” 
petitioner was “white” and therefore eligible for naturalization, another 
federal district court judge relied heavily on the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo, the Adams–Onís Treaty, and the Gadsden Treaty, which had 
naturalized numerous Mexican inhabitants of newly acquired territories 
without regard to race.172 In fact, in Justice McLean’s dissenting 
opinion in Dred Scott he noted that “on the question of citizenship it 
must be admitted that we have not been very fastidious,” referencing 
the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in which “we have made citizens of 
all grades, combinations, and colors,” and the Adams–Onís Treaty 
which naturalized the inhabitants of the annexed Florida and Louisiana 
territories without regard to race.173 
Following World War I and the emergence of displaced and 
stateless persons like the Armenians, this rhetorical strategy of unifying 
against a common enemy also served the plight of such groups who 
sought asylum before legal protections for asylees had matured. This 
strategy appears in the opinions issued in two cases before the United 
States Board of Immigration Appeals during the early Cold War era, 
for example, determining the racial eligibility of refugees from the 
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Soviet Union for admission to the United States after they had been 
refused entry by immigration officials on the basis that they were not 
“white” and therefore “ineligible to citizenship” as defined by the 
Immigration Act of 1924. In opinions concluding that the Tatar and 
Kalmyk immigrants in these cases were “white” within the meaning of 
the Nationality Act of 1940 “in spite of their Asiatic origin” and 
overturning the decisions to deny the immigrants admission, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals highlights the systematic displacement and 
deportation of the immigrants by the Soviet government. In a 1950 
case involving a Tatar immigrant from eastern Russia, “Mohammedan 
by religion,” the Board notes that the immigrant was a soldier in the 
Red Army from 1941 to 1945 but after he was captured by the German 
army “he stated that he was born in Istanbul, Turkey, to avoid 
repatriation to Russia,” and that the people of his birthplace were 
“reportedly being systematically displaced or exterminated and 
replaced by a special military class of so-called Russianized Cossacks 
or trusted members of the Red Army’s communist youth 
organization.”174 Similarly, in a 1951 case involving Kalmyk 
immigrants, the Board notes that the immigrants in the case “fled from 
Russia about 1920, after resisting the communist revolutionary forces,” 
that in 1943 the Soviet Politbureau “determined that the Kalmuks 
should be displaced and deported, because they opposed the oppressive 
regime and, hence, were considered wanting in loyalty, dangerous to 
the State,” and that the “helpless Kalmuk minority group” was herded 
into unheated railroad cars and deported, “without warning and at gun-
point,” many of them dying en route.175 In both cases, the Board’s 
opinions emphasize that the immigrants had been subjected to 
deportation and eliminationist campaigns by America’s new Cold War 
enemy the Soviet Union and were seeking refuge in the United States, 
reflecting a persecutory agency remarkably similar to that of the 
Armenian defense in Cartozian. 
In Matthew Frye Jacobson’s examination of the relationship 
between whiteness and American imperialism, he refers to a similar 
process he calls the “crucible of empire,” by which the whiteness of 
non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants from Europe whose whiteness had often 
been considered inferior to that of Anglo-Saxons during the late 
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nineteenth century was confirmed as American expansion into the 
Pacific and the imagination of Pacific natives as “savages” dissolved 
the boundary between such “superior” and “inferior” whites.176 The 
racial prerequisite cases reveal similar examples of this process far 
beyond the probationary “white” races of Europe, however, as 
Armenians and other immigrants from central and western Asia were 
also made “white” by the alchemic process of appealing to persecutory 
narratives such as the defense’s narrative of Turkish persecution in 
Cartozian, and it is important to note that this process reflects specific 
rhetorical strategies adopted by the participants in the cases as they 
negotiated group identities amid the growing tensions between race, 
religion, and nationality in the early twentieth century.177 
According to Sam Keen, human beings create enemies “not 
because we are intrinsically cruel, but because focusing our anger on 
an outside target, striking at strangers, brings our tribe or nation 
together and allows us to be part of a close and loving in-group,” or in 
other words, “we create surplus evil because we need to belong.”178 It 
is a mistake to conclude that “striking at strangers” creates this sense of 
solidarity or belonging, however, for as Arthur Koestler writes, it is the 
human capacity for devotion rather than aggression that causes wars.179 
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In numerous instances throughout the discourse surrounding the racial 
prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, when the racial eligibility for 
naturalization or the scope of the term “white” within the meaning of 
the Act is expanded to include individuals or groups a passive or 
persecutory agency is used to frame the actions of the petitioners. 
When petitioners sought to establish their racial eligibility for 
naturalization solely through direct evidence of assimilability, by 
contrast, advancing narratives in which they played an active role by 
recounting their history of conquests, development of civilized society, 
or the discriminatory segregation of non-“white” people such as 
Africans and aborigines, they were held to be racially ineligible for 
naturalization even when they presented an impressive list of such 
evidence. Moreover, numerous military expediencies expanded the 
racial demographics of American citizenship through the naturalization 
provisions of annexation treaties such as those discussed above and 
legislative extensions of racial eligibility to military allies surrounding 
World War I and World War II. Thus, although in Justice McLean’s 
dissent in Dred Scott he argues that “on the question of citizenship it 
must be admitted that we have not been very fastidious,”180 when 
viewed from a rhetorical perspective the decisions regarding racial 
eligibility for naturalization appear to flow from a consistent motive of 
solidarity in defense of the nation, whether the perceived threats that 
supported this motive were real or fictional. Throughout the discourse 
surrounding the racial prerequisite in the Naturalization Act, appeals to 
unify against a common enemy nearly always accompanied findings of 
racial eligibility for naturalization while similar appeals were nearly 
always absent when racial eligibility for naturalization was denied. 
Such appeals also frequently received an emphasis that suggests they 
were considered particularly persuasive by comparison with other 
factors that were used to racially classify the petitioners. 
The contrast between these rhetorical strategies suggests that the 
maxim “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” commonly used to 
describe unification against a common enemy, might be more aptly 
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formulated as “the victim of my enemy is my friend.” As Chris Hedges 
explains the close bond felt by fellow soldiers in war: 
The closeness of a unit, and even as a reporter one enters 
into that fraternity once you have been together under 
fire, is possible only with the wolf of death banging at 
the door. The feeling is genuine, but without the threat of 
violence and death it cannot be sustained.181 
The unifying power of violent attacks such as Pearl Harbor and 
September 11, as well as the many minor examples of threats in human 
society, is in the first instance an effect not of anger but of fear, and is 
intensified only when the enemy is rhetorically framed as the 
aggressor. It is Armenians maintaining their Christianity in Asia Minor 
by standing firm “in the face of tremendous odds” against “the 
onslaught of Mohammedanism” perpetrated by Turks, Kurds, and 
Syrian Muslims,182 or the “helpless Kalmuk minority,” who “without 
warning and at gun-point,” were “herded into unheated railroad cars,” 
“without benefit of food or water, many [dying] en route, while the rest 
were scattered in various spots of the Soviet Union.”183 The powerful 
force to unify against a common enemy, as in these examples, is not 
created by banging at the door of the wolf of death, but by the wolf of 
death banging at the door. 
By illustrating how this rhetorical strategy operates in the racial 
prerequisite cases, Cartozian also reveals the failure of the “historical 
interpretation” of race as a substitute for racialist science in the case 
law interpreting the racial prerequisites in the Act. Although the courts 
of the early twentieth century that adopted the “historical 
interpretation” of race openly recognized, as Ian Haney López notes, 
that race is not “a biologically defined group, a static taxonomy, a 
neutral designation of difference, an objective description of 
immutable traits, a scientifically defensible division of humankind, 
[nor] an accident of nature unmolded by the hands of people,”184 but a 
highly contingent political commodity that is socially, culturally, and 
historically constructed, they continued to enforce the racial 
prerequisites in the Naturalization Act through a historiography that 
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was equally if not more capable of effecting racial divisions than 
biological determinism. Rather than conclude that because race was 
socially, culturally, and historically constructed the racial prerequisite 
to naturalization was so ambiguous as to be impracticable of 
application, the racial prerequisite courts of the early twentieth century 
constructed racial classifications through a dramaturgy of enmity that 
imagined American identity against perceived threats to the nation. The 
fact that in Cartozian the defense constructed Armenian whiteness by 
representing Turks, Kurds, and Syrian Muslims as non-“white” when 
these and other people from the Middle East had largely been held to 
be “white” for purposes of naturalization even suggests that the form of 
this rhetorical strategy itself may have been particularly important. 
By shifting the focus to a rhetoric of fear that adapted itself to 
changes in the geopolitics of the era, the ability of this rhetorical 
strategy to transcend racial differences to unify against a common 
enemy explains perceived contradictions in the racial prerequisite cases 
where emphasis on direct evidence of assimilability fails. It is 
important to emphasize that this was not a political ideology but a 
rhetorical strategy, however, and that the geopolitics of the early 
twentieth century only provided the material with which the 
participants in the cases could rhetorically construct group identities. 
The rhetorical situation of individual cases must be closely examined, 
particularly the arguments and evidence advanced by the participants 
and the identity issues implicated by the historical context at the time, 
to understand the effect of persuasion on the cases. Although the courts 
continued to exclude certain petitioners from naturalization on the 
basis of race until the racial prerequisites were finally removed from 
the Act in 1952,185 the broader threats to the nation that emerged during 
the Second World War brought further erosion of the policy of racial 
exclusion in naturalization as eligibility was extended to people in 
China, India, and the Philippines to bolster their support for the war 
effort, and judicial and administrative interpretations of the racial 
prerequisite broadened in individual cases from similar motives, but 
only after these threats and the solidarity to oppose them were 
rhetorically constructed. It is perhaps fitting that in the final lines of the 
last published judicial opinion in a racial prerequisite case, Judge 
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Charles Wyzanski adopts this rhetorical strategy to advocate an end to 
the policy of racial exclusion, writing that the policies of exclusion 
reflected in the racial prerequisite to naturalization “are not only false 
to our professions of democratic liberalism but repugnant to our vital 
interests as a world power,” and 
in so far as the Nationality Act of 1940 is still open to 
interpretation, it is highly desirable that it should be 
interpreted so as to promote friendlier relations between 
the United States and other nations and so as to fulfill 
the promise that we shall treat all men as created equal. 
 
Petition for citizenship granted.186 
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